10/5/12

Non-economic damage caps upheld in Miller v. Johnson decision issued by Kansas Supreme Court

Kansas' prior $250,000 cap on pain, suffering, harship, inconveinence, scarring, and other non-economic damages ruled unconstitutional

Today the Kansas Supreme Court issued a decision in Miller v. Johnson, a case which had challenged the damage caps on non-economic damages.  This case is a medical malpractice case filed in Douglas County, Kansas District Court. The plaintiff sued over a laparoscopic procedure performed in 2002. In 2006, the jury awarded $759,679, of which $400,000 was for non-economic damages. The district court reduced the award for non-economic damages to $250,000, consistent with Kansas law (KSA 60-19a02).

The plaintiff appealed the decision, challenging the constitutionality of the cap on non-economic damages. The plaintiff contends the cap on damages violates four provisions in the Kansas Constitution: the rights of equal protection, trial by jury, and remedy by due course of law, and the principle of separation of powers.

The case was awaiting hearing in an appellate court when it was pulled up to the Supreme Court by a request from the justices. Arguments in the case were heard October 29, 2009; in February 2011, the Court re-heard the case due to changes in the Court's composition. An opinion in the case is expected to be issued on October 5, 2012. 

Opponents of the decision claim that the lack of caps will cause medical malpractice insurance to double, a claim they have not provided support for.

9/20/12

Motorist assist worker killed on I-70 in Missouri while assisting with a multiple car collision

Highway fatality accident may have been due to drunk driving

A Missouri Department of Transportation motorist assist worker was killed while working a crash on Interstate 70 early Friday morning.  The worker who was killed was assisting with a different accident just before 2:00 AM. 

In the first highway crash, two people were ejected from a vehicle in a rollover on the highway.  Initially, Independence police said one of the victims died, but investigators later said that the person was in critical condition at a hospital.

Independence police said a driver apparently did not see the motorist assistance truck and collided with it at about 2:45 a.m., causing the motorist assist truck to burst into flames.

The deceased driver of the motorist-assist truck was out of the vehicle, working the accident by helping to direct traffic when he was hit by the car after it struck his truck.  He died at the scene.

The Missouri Department of Transportation said the deceased motorist assist worker was Clifton J. Scott, 50, who celebrated 15 years with the MDOT on Monday.

MDOT said it would temporarily suspend all motorist assist operations until further notice because of the fatal crash.

The driver who hit the truck and Mr. Scott was ambulanced to a hospital with serious injuries. Jackson County prosecutors charged David C. Murdick, 35, of Blue Springs, with first-degree involuntary manslaughter Friday afternoon.

According to court documents, Murdick's blood-alcohol level tested at 0.184 percent at a hospital after the crash.

9/4/12

Missouri lawmakers debating sales taxes for vehicles purchased out of state

Lt. Gov. Peter Kinder, a Republican from Cape Girardeau, told radio host Mike Ferguson Tuesday that he does not support a legislative attempt to override Nixon's decision on legislation reinstating local sales taxes on out-of-state vehicle purchases.

"I don’t think expending a lot of effort to override a governor’s veto, which happens only very rarely, is the way to proceed here," Kinder said.

The legislation was passed in May in response to a Missouri Supreme Court ruling that local sales taxes cannot be levied when vehicle purchases are made in another state. They also can't be applied to sales between two individuals, the court found.
The bill attempted to reverse the decision and allow the taxes to be collected, with proponents arguing that the ruling put Missouri at an economic disadvantage by giving residents a tax incentive to buy vehicles in neighboring states like Kansas. They were also concerned that the loss of the tax revenue would hurt local government budgets.

The bill applied retroactively, meaning anyone who avoided taxes due to the court ruling would be forced to pay them once the legislation went into effect.

Nixon, a Democrat, vetoed the measure because he said it amounted to a new tax without a public vote.

Last week, Nixon released figures from the Department of Revenue showing no local sales taxes were paid on 122,702 vehicles bought after the March 21 effective date of the court ruling. Of those, only 14,000 were vehicles purchased from out-of-state dealerships, or roughly 11 percent.

9/3/12

Shawnee, Kansas Woman killed in SUV rollover crash in Linn County, KS

Kansas teenage driver of the Ford Explorer SUV rolled over, severely injuring 2 and killing 1

Yesterday the Kansas Highway Patrol released information on a Shawnee woman was killed Monday when the SUV she was in, driven by her teenage dauighter, crashed in Linn County, Kan, about an hour south of Olathe, Kansas

The KHP said the 1999 Ford Explorer was being driven by a teenage girl of Parker. The girl was injured and taken to a hospital, but her condition was unknown. Two other passengers, a teenage girl and a teenage boy, both of Paola, were also injured, but their conditions also were not known.

The KHP said the Ford Explorer was driving north on 1077 Road in Linn County when it left the east side of the road. The driver overcorrected and lost control. The vehicle came back onto the road and went into the west ditch, where it rolled several times. The vehicle came to rest on its top.

Neither the woman killed nor the boy severely injured were wearing seat belts. The driver and the other girl were wearing seat belts.

8/22/12

Learn how to adjust your driving style between all-wheel drive, front-wheel drive, and rear-wheel drive

An all-wheel-drive car will behave similar to a FWD machine, in terms of the car will likely want to understeer. The main difference will be that it will not be quite as susceptible to the vicious power-down-push that you experience with a FWD. Take the Nissan GT-R, for example. Amazing handling car, no doubt, but the AWD produces a lot of mid corner understeer, especially in the tighter turns. The difference is the power down does not drastically increase the push. In fact the rear has a tendency to break loose. This is likely because of the increased steering lock mid turn, due to the understeer, and when the front does eventually grip up, the vast amount of lock hooks the front, causing the rear to snap.

RWD machines are far easier to deal with. For the simple reason that you can actually use the throttle to help you turn, because all the power is directly connected to the rear axle. So if we apply power, the rear tires lose a touch of traction and slide, helping us rotate the car mid corner. With this ability it means we can concentrate on releasing the brake early on entry and rolling a lot of speed through apex (this will be with almost no pedals whatsoever). The reason we can do this and gain a lot of speed on entry and mid corner is because we do not need to focus as much on rotating the car, as power will actually help us now, not hurt us. Of course, don't completely neglect rotation. The laws of physics still apply and when we apply power the weight will still shift back leaving the front tires light. But as I said, the throttle can now help compensate for this.

8/10/12

Man rolls truck over on bridge, then strips and runs away

Driver hit another truck and crashed through guard gates before flipping his own truck

Earlier this week, a truck driver crashed through two of a bridges guard gates, flipped his pickup truck, stripped off his clothes and ran to the Castillo de San Marcos in Florida.

The man, whose identity was given by police asGregory John Jarousek, 39, of Flagler Beach has not been release from custody. Police say he was driving his small white truck west across the bridge at about 1:30 p.m., said St. Augustine Police Department spokesman Sgt. Brian Frasca.

The drawbridge had just closed after letting through boats, but the bridges gates were still down. The driver sped through the metal and wooden gates, hit a large Ford pickup in the eastbound lane and flipped on its side on the bridge, Frasca said.

After his truck came to rest, the driver got out and ran down the bridge and along Avenida Menendez toward the fort, Frasca said. As he ran, blood streaming down the front of his head, he started taking off his clothes.

The driver ran into the fort and up onto the second story. Frasca said police officers and National Park Service employees cornered the man in a room to secure him and he tried to fight back.

He tried to fight everybody, Frasca said. I guess he realized he couldnt, so he climbed over the railing and jumped.

The man fell about 14 feet, Frasca said, hitting the back of his head when he landed.

Police secured him on the ground and paramedics and fire rescue workers treated his injuries at the scene.

The man was flown to Orange Park Medical Center with a fractured skull. Frasca said it is most likely this injury was a result of the mans fall from the balcony, not the crash.

The people in the truck that was hit on the bridge were not injured.

The man is facing possible charges of fleeing the scene of an accident and resisting arrest with violence, Frasca said.

Police are waiting for the results of a toxicology report before pressing additional charges, he said. Results could take about two to three months.

While the bridge was closed for repairs, traffic was rerouted to State Road 312.

The broken gates caused malfunctions with the drawbridges locking sensors.

7/31/12

Missouri Supreme Court Rules Medical Malpractice Caps are Unconstitutional

Opinion issued July 31, 2012
Deborah Watts filed the underlying medical malpractice action alleging that her
son, Naython Watts, was born with disabling brain injuries because Cox Medical Centers
and its associated physicians (collectively, Cox) provided negligent health care services.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Watts and awarded $1.45 million in non-economic
damages and $3.371 million in future medical damages. The trial court entered a
judgment reducing Watts non-economic damages to $350,000 as required by section 538.210.
1
The judgment also established a periodic payment schedule pursuant to section
538.220. The periodic payment schedule required immediate payment of half of all net
future medical damages with the other half paid in equal annual installments over the
next 50 years with an interest rate of 0.26 percent.
Watts asserts that the section 538.210 cap on non-economic damages violates the
right to trial by jury and several other provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
2
Watts
also asserts that the section 538.220 periodic payment schedule was arbitrary and
unreasonable in that it does not assure full compensation due to the low interest rate and
50-year payment schedule.
Cox has filed a cross-appeal asserting that the trial court erred in its immediate
award of future medical damages. Cox asserts that section 538.220 prohibits a lump sum
payment of a portion of future medical damages and, instead, requires that all future
medical damages be paid pursuant to a periodic payment schedule regardless of when the
need for the medical damage payments will arise.
This Court holds that section 538.210 is unconstitutional to the extent that it
infringes on the jurys constitutionally protected purpose of determining the amount of

1
All statutory references to statutes are to RSMo 2000.
2
Watts asserts that section 538.210 also violates the constitutional separation of powers,
article II, section 1; equal protection, article I, section II; the prohibition against special
legislation, article III, section 40; and the clear title and single subject requirements of
article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. Because this Court finds that section
538.210 violates the right to trial by jury in article I, section 22(a), these challenges need
to be addressed. Watts also asserts that section 538.220 violates equal protection and the
right to due process. This Court need not reach these issues because the trial court
misapplied the statute, and this Court will not reach constitutional issues if the case can
be decided on statutory grounds. damages sustained by an injured party. Such a limitation was not permitted at common
law when Missouris constitution first was adopted in 1820 and, therefore, violates the
right to trial by jury guaranteed by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it caps non-economic damages
pursuant to section 538.210. To the extent that the decision in Adams By and Through
Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. banc 1992), is inconsistent
with this decision, it is overruled.
This Court further holds that the trial court abused its discretion in entering a
periodic payment schedule pursuant to section 538.220 that did not assure full
compensation due to the interest rate and 50-year payment schedule.
Finally, this Court holds that section 538.220 gives the judge the authority to
determine the manner in which future damages shall be paid, including what portion
should be paid in future installments as to both medical and other future damages. Coxs
argument on cross-appeal that all future damages must be paid in a lump sum is rejected.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded.
I. Facts
Cox provided prenatal care to Watts. On October 30, 2006, when she was
approximately 39 weeks pregnant, Watts went to a clinic associated with Cox because
she was experiencing cramping and because she detected decreased fetal movement. Dr.
Herrman, who was then a third-year medical resident, examined Watts. The evidence at
trial indicated that Dr. Herrman did not perform appropriate tests, failed to notify Watts
of the significance of decreased fetal movement and failed to perform any further
3diagnostic monitoring. Dr. Herrmans supervisor, Dr. Kelly, signed off on Dr. Herrmans
findings.
On November 1, 2006, Watts was admitted to the hospital due to lack of fetal
movement. Watts was placed on a fetal monitor at 9:10 a.m. Watts expert, Dr. Roberts,
testified that this diagnostic monitoring indicated fetal hypoxia and acidosis and that the
standard of care required immediate Caesarean-section delivery. Dr. Green, the secondyear medical resident who was examining Watts, did not begin the Caesarean section
until 10:45 a.m. Naython Watts was born with catastrophic brain injuries.
Watts sued Cox, claiming that its doctors malpractice caused Naythons brain
injuries. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Watts and awarded $1.45
million in non-economic damages and $3.371 million in future medical damages. The
jury then reduced the future medical damages to present value pursuant to section
538.220. The jury reduced the future damages at a rate of 4 percent per annum, the
estimated yield on a safe long-term investment, which worked out to a present value of
$1,747,600. Cox then requested that it be permitted to pay the future damages in periodic
payments pursuant to section 538.220. In response, the trial court entered a payment
schedule under which half of the future damages would be paid immediately in a lump
sum and half would be paid over a 50-year period at a statutorily required interest rate of
0.26 percent..
II. Standard of Review
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal because it involves a
challenge to the validity of a statute of this state. Mo. Const. article V, section 3. Watts
4constitutional challenge to the validity of section 538.210 is subject to de novo review.
Rentschler v. Nixon, 311 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2010). A statute is presumed
valid and will not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional
provision. Id. at 786. Watts has the burden of proving that the statutes clearly and
undoubtedly violate the constitution. Id.
Watts argument that the trial court erred by requiring one-half of future medical
damages to be paid pursuant to a section 538.220 periodic payment schedule is subject
to review only on the basis of its arbitrariness. Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833
S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. banc 1992). Appellate courts ask whether a circuit court abused
its discretion in crafting a periodic payment schedule for future damages. Davolt v.
Highland, 119 S.W.3d 118, 139 (Mo. App. 2003). A trial court will be found to have
abused its discretion when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then
before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and
indicate a lack of careful consideration. Klotz v. St. Anthonys Medical Center, 311
S.W.3d 752, 760 (Mo. banc 2010)(quoting Swartz v. Gale Webb Transp. Co., 215 S.W.3d
127, 129-130 (Mo. banc 2007)).
Coxs cross appeal asserts that section 538.220 requires all future medical
damages to be paid according to a periodic payment schedule. This is a statutory
interpretation argument subject to de novo review. Spradling v. SSM Health Care St.
Louis, 313 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Mo. banc 2010). This Courts role in interpreting statutes is
to discern the intent of the legislature from the plain and ordinary meaning of the
language used and to give effect to that intent, if possible. Id.
5III. Section 538.210 Violates the Right to Trial by Jury
Watts asserts that the $350,000 cap on non-economic damages established by
section 538.210 violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by article I, section 22(a) of
the Missouri Constitution, which provides that the right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate . Cox notes correctly that in AdamsI, the Court held
that the statutory cap on non-economic damages does not violate the right to trial by jury.
Cox asserts that Adams is dispositive. Watts asserts that Adams was decided wrongly and
should be overruled.
A. Article I, Section 22(a) Requires that the Right of Trial by Jury as
Heretofore Enjoyed Shall Remain Inviolate
Article I, section 22(a) is one of the fundamental guarantees of the Missouri
Constitution, providing the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate . The plain language of article I, section 22(a) requires analysis of two
propositions to determine if the cap imposed by section 538.210 violates the state
constitutional right to trial by jury.
The first portion of article I, section 22(a) requires a determination of whether
Watts medical negligence action and claim for non-economic damages is included
within the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed. The phrase heretofore enjoyed
means that [c]itizens of Missouri are entitled to a jury trial in all actions to which they
would have been entitled to a jury when the Missouri Constitution was adopted in 1820.
State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003). In the context of this
case, the scope of that right also is defined by common law limitations on the amount of a
6jurys damage award. See, Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 775 (Wolff, J., concurring). Therefore,
if Missouri common law entitled a plaintiff to a jury trial on the issue of non-economic
damages in a medical negligence action in 1820, Watts has a state constitutional right to a
jury trial on her claim for damages for medical malpractice.
The second portion requires this Court to determine whether the right to trial by
jury remain[s] inviolate when a statutory cap requires courts to reduce the jurys
verdict. The plain meaning of the word inviolate means free from change or blemish,
pure or unbroken. WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1993).
Therefore, if the statutory cap changes the common law right to a jury determination of
damages, the right to trial by jury does not remain inviolate and the cap is
unconstitutional.
B. The Nature of the Right To Jury Trial Heretofore Enjoyed
To determine the nature of the right to trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed, a
court must assess the state of the common law when the Missouri Constitution was
adopted in 1820. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 85. Missouris common law is based on the
common law of England as of 1607. Section 1.010. English common law recognized
medical negligence as one of five types of private wrongs that could be redressed in
court. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 122 (1765; 1992 reprint).
English common law also permitted recovery of non-economic damages to give the
sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 1112 (1765; 1992 reprint). Similarly, Missouris territorial laws that pre-dated
7statehood provided for jury trials in all civil cases of the value of one hundred dollars ...
if either of the parties require it. Mo. Terr. Laws 58, sec. 13; Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 85.
Accordingly, civil actions for damages resulting from personal wrongs have been
tried by juries since 1820. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 92. Watts action for medical negligence,
including her claim for non-economic damages, falls into that category and is the same
type of case that was recognized at common law when the constitution was adopted in
1820. Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 561 (Mo. 1844)(medical negligence claims, referred to as
imperitia meidi culpu annumeratur, are a well settled part of the civil law); see
also Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 775 (Wolff, J., concurring) (Mo. banc 2010); Atlanta
Oculoplastic Surgery P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 222 (Ga. 2010)(non-economic
damages have long been recognized as an element of total damages in tort cases,
including those involving medical negligence). Watts has a right to trial by jury on her
claim for non-economic damages caused by medical negligence.
The scope of Watts right to a jury trial, like the existence of the right, also is
defined by Missouris common law at the time the Missouri Constitution was adopted in
1820. By the late 1600s, the English common law authorized judges to exercise control
over juries by granting new trials in cases in which the verdict was deemed inconsistent
with the evidence. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
135 (5th ed. 1956) cited in Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 776 (Wolff, J., concurring). Although
English common law recognized the validity of some judicial control over jury verdicts,
in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the United States Supreme Court, using the
same historical analysis required for Missouris right to jury trial, found that there were
8few common law precedents authorizing judicial remittitur but that the procedure was a
part of the common law and, consequently, a part of the federal constitutional jury trial
right. 293 U.S. at 482-483. This remittitur procedure has been followed since in the
federal courts. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 776 (Wolff, J., concurring).
Like the English and early American common law, Missouri state common law
also has recognized judicial remittitur. For instance, one of this Courts earliest cases
following statehood stated that if the jury find greater damages than the plaintiff has
counted for, [and] the Court render judgment according to such finding, it is error.
Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 777 (Wolff, J., concurring)(quoting, Carr & Co. v. Edwards, 1 Mo.
137, 137 (Mo. 1821)). Similarly, in Hoyt v. Reed, 16 Mo. 294, 294 (1852), the Court
affirmed the trial courts remittitur of damages because the jury erroneously included an
item for which the defendant was not liable. See also Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 778 (Wolff,
J., concurring). Judicial remittitur was and is an established concept in Missouris
common law.
Although early Missouri cases approved of judicial remittitur, there are cases that
have held that judicial remittitur is improper. For instance, in Gurley v. Mo. Pac., 16
S.W. 11, 17 (Mo. 1891), the Court refused to remit the damages in a personal injury case
because, [w]hen we set aside any part of the verdict, we destroy its integrity, and we
have no right to set ourselves up as triers of facts, and render another and different
verdict. Gurley stated that if a jury verdict clearly was based on passion or prejudice,
the proper remedy was to set it aside in its entirety, but that absent such passion or
prejudice, it should be upheld. Id. Likewise, in Rodney v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 30 S.W.
9150, 150 (Mo. 1895), and again in Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693
S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. banc 1985), this Court held that judicial remittitur was not a valid
exercise of judicial power.
Although the precedent regarding judicial remittitur is inconsistent precedent, the
inconsistency stems from a long-standing reluctance in the common law to tamper with
the jurys constitutional role as the finder of fact. As noted by Judge Wolff in his
concurring opinion in Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 774, this history demonstrates that statutory
caps on damage awards simply did not exist and were not contemplated by the common
law when the people of Missouri adopted their constitution in 1820 guaranteeing that the
right to trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. The right to trial by
jury heretofore enjoyed was not subject to legislative limits on damages.
C. Do Damage Caps Allow the Right to Jury Trial to Remain Inviolate?
Having established that the right to trial by jury heretofore enjoyed did not
include legislative limits on damages, the next inquiry is whether the right to trial by jury
remain[s] inviolate after application of the section 538.210 cap on non-economic
damages.
1. The Amount of Damages is a Fact for the Jury to Determine.
Missouri law long has recognized that one of the jurys primary functions is to
determine the plaintiffs damages. For instance, in Richardson v. State Highway &
Transp. Commn, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993), this Court recognized that
Missouris constitution gives the jury the right and responsibility to determine damages,
stating, [T]he jury here assessed liability and determined damages, thus fulfilling its
10constitutional task. Id. at 880; accord, Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 775 (Wolff, J., concurring).
Likewise, even though Adams held that a cap on non-economic damages did not violate
the right to trial by jury, the Court still recognized that the jurys primary function is
fact-finding. This includes a determination of a plaintiffs damages. 832 S.W.2d at 907.
It is beyond dispute that Missouri law always has recognized that the jurys role in a
civil case is to determine the facts relating to both liability and damages and to enter a
verdict accordingly. Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Natl Auto Sales N., LLC, 361
S.W.3d 364, 382 (Mo. banc 2012).
3
Like any other type of damages, the amount of noneconomic damages is a fact that must be determined by the jury and is subject to the
protections of the article I, section 22(a) right to trial by jury.
2. Section 538.210 violates the right to trial by jury.
Once the right to a trial by jury attaches, as it does in this case, the plaintiff has the
full benefit of that right free from the reach of hostile legislation. Section 538.210
imposes a cap on the jurys award of non-economic damages that operates wholly
independent of the facts of the case. As such, section 538.210 directly curtails the jurys
determination of damages and, as a result, necessarily infringes on the right to trial by

3
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized that the jurys primary role is to
ascertain the facts of a case. The controlling distinction between the power of the court and
that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine the
facts. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486. This means that, even when a verdict is set aside as excessive
due to bias or prejudice, the court must allow the winning party a right to a new trial because
both plaintiff and defendant:
[R]emain entitled, as they were entitled in the first instance, to have a jury
properly determine the question of liability and the extent of the injury by an
assessment of damages. Both are questions of fact.

Id.
11jury when applied to a cause of action to which the right to jury trial attaches at common
law. Because the common law did not provide for legislative limits on the jurys
assessment of civil damages, Missouri citizens retain their individual right to trial by jury
subject only to judicial remittitur based on the evidence in the case. Statutory damage
caps were not permissible in 1820 and, pursuant to the plain language of article I, section
22(a), remain impermissible today. Statutory caps on damages in cases in which the right
to trial by jury applies necessarily changes and impairs the right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed. The individual right to trial by jury cannot remain inviolate when
an injured party is deprived of the jurys constitutionally assigned role of determining
damages according to the particular facts of the case. Section 538.210 necessarily and
unavoidably violates the state constitutional right to trial by jury.
The foregoing analysis has been utilized by a number of other states with
constitutions that, like Missouris, require that the right to jury trial shall remain
inviolate. These states also have concluded that, because the assessment of damages is
one of the factual findings assigned to the jury rather than to a judge, any limit on
damages that restricts the jurys fact-finding role violates the constitutional right to trial
by jury.
For instance, in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989), the court
recognized that the jurys fact-finding function included the determination of damages.
This evidence can only lead to the conclusion that our constitution protects the jurys
role to determine damages. Id. at 716. Consequently, when you start to put
limitations on [the jurys ability to find damages], you have, in fact, invaded the province
12of the jury and have not preserved the right to a trial by jury inviolate. Id. at 722
(quoting Washington Senate Journal, 49th Legislature 1986, at 449).
Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999), similarly held [t]he amount
of damages from the beginning of trial by jury, was a fact to be found by jurors,
therefore, a statutory cap violates the right to jury trial because to the extent that the
jurys award exceeds the statutory cap, the statute prevents the jurys award from having
its full and intended effect. Id. at 470-73 (quoting Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on
the Law of Damages 24 (1935)).
Nestlehutt and Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assn, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991),
reached similar conclusions. Noting that Dimick held that the determination of damages
rests peculiarly within the province of the jury, Nestlehutt also concluded that caps
infringe on a partys constitutional right to a jury determination as to noneconomic
damages. 691 S.E.2d at 222-23 (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 480). Moore held that
statutory damage caps on common law causes of action violate the right to trial by jury
because the trial judge is required summarily to disregard the jurys assessment of the
amount of noneconomic loss, that species of damages lying most peculiarly within the
jurys discretion. 592 So.2d at 163.
Smith v. Dept of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987), similarly recognizes that a
limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered by an injured party violates
the Florida constitutions guarantee of both the right to jury trial and the right of access to
courts, stating:
Access to courts is granted for the purpose of redressing injuries. A plaintiff
13who receives a jury verdict for, e.g., $1,000,000, has not received a
constitutional redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily,
caps the recovery at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the jury verdict is
being arbitrarily capped, is the plaintiff receiving the constitutional benefit
of a jury trial as we have heretofore understood that right. Further, if the
legislature may constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there is no
discernible reason why it could not cap the recovery at some other figure,
perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or even $1.
Id. at 1088-89.
This Court holds that section 538.210 violates the article I, section 22(a) right to
trial by jury.
3. Adams Violates the Right to a Jury Determination of Damages.
Cox asserts, consistent with the rationale in Adams, that the section 538.210 cap
on non-economic damages does not limit the jurys constitutional role in determining
damages because the jury remains free to award damages consistent with the evidence in
the case. Adams held that section 538.210 does not violate the right to trial by jury
because the cap is applied by the trial court after the jury completed its constitutional
task of determining the plaintiffs economic and non-economic damages. Id at 907.
Although recognizing that the jurys primary function is to find facts, including the
amount of damages, Adams reasoned that a statutory cap on damages lets the jury do its
job and then simply directs the court not to enter the full amount of the verdict in the
judgment if the amount of non-economic damages exceeds the statutory cap. Id. In
other words, application of the damage cap is a matter of law, not fact, and not within
the purview of the jury. Id. Furthermore, Adams found that even if a damages cap
interferes with the jurys determination of damages, it does not violate the right to jury
14trial because that right does not protect the jurys determination of damages. Id.
There are four flaws in the Adams rationale. First, Adams fundamentally
misconstrues the nature of the right to trial by jury. While article I, section 22(a) sets the
constitutional role of the jury, it does so by guaranteeing an individual right to a trial by
jury. The application of section 538.210 may permit the jury to perform its constitutional
role, but it deprives the individual of his or her right to the damages awarded by the jury.
The constitutional significance of the jurys role in determining damages is reflected in
the analytical basis for determining whether the right to trial by jury attaches -- if the
action is a civil action for damages, then the right to a jury trial attaches and must
remain inviolate. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d. at 84. Because the constitutional right to a civil
jury trial is contingent upon there being an action for damages, statutory limits on those
damages directly curtail the individual right to one of the most significant constitutional
roles performed by the jury -- the determination of damages. The argument that section
538.210 does not interfere with the right to trial by jury because the jury had a practically
meaningless opportunity to assess damages simply pays lip service to the form of the
jury but robs it of its function. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721; see also Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at
223 ([b]y requiring the court to reduce a noneconomic damages award determined by a
jury that exceeds the statutory limit, [a statutory cap] clearly nullifies the jurys findings
of fact regarding damages and thereby undermines the jurys basic function); Moore,
592 So. 2d at 164 ([b]ecause the statute caps the jurys verdict automatically and
absolutely, the jurys function, to the extent the verdict exceeds the damages ceiling,
assumes less than an advisory status)(emphasis in original).
15Second, Adams further misconstrues the right to trial by jury because it
specifically permits legislative limitation of an individual constitutional right. Adams
justifies the section 538.210 damage cap because the jury nominally is permitted to find
the facts while the judge statutorily is required to make a separate legal determination that
applies the damages cap. The unavoidable result of this rationale is that right to trial by
jury is directly subject to legislative limitation. This holding is untenable for the simple
reason that a statutory limit on the state constitutional right to trial by jury amounts to an
impermissible legislative alteration of the Constitution. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 85, 92 [t]he
right to trial by jury, where it applies, is a constitutional right, applies regardless of any
statutory provision, and is beyond the reach of hostile legislation)(citing Lee v.
Conran, 111 S.W. 1151, 1153 (Mo. 1908)); see also Missouri Alliance of Retired Am. v.
Dept. of Labor and Indust. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 682 (Mo. banc 2009)(a statute
may not infringe on a constitutional right; if the two are in conflict, then it is the statute
rather than the constitution that must give way).
Adams did not acknowledge, must less distinguish, the myriad cases recognizing
that a statute may not limit constitutional rights, which are beyond the reach of hostile
legislation. Instead, it cited to De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640 (Mo.
1931), to argue that the legislature could abolish a common law cause of action for
damages against an employer when it substituted a system of workers compensation in
its stead, and then said that if this were true, then it must be that [i]f the legislature has
the constitutional power to create and abolish causes of action, the legislature also has the
power to limit recovery in those causes of action. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907.
16This statement is Adams total analysis on this issue, and other cases upholding
statutory damage caps simply repeat this mantra. They do so without any further analysis
and without addressing how this reasoning can stand in the face of their continued
recognition that statutes cannot limit constitutional rights. Indeed, if the two were
equivalent, then it would be De May and similar cases that would have to be overruled.
But De May itself recognized that its analysis, even if it is accepted as valid, applies only
when the cause of action cognizable at law is abrogated or removed that is, it held
only that if there is no cause of action, there is nothing to which the right to jury trial can
attach. Id. at 649. Nothing in it suggested a legislature can take constitutional
protections from a plaintiff seeking relief under existing causes of action. If that could be
done, it would make constitutional protections of only theoretical value they would
exist only unless and until limited by the legislature. Such rights would not be rights at
all but merely privileges that could be withdrawn.
Third, Adams cites to the United States Supreme Court decision in Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), for the proposition that the right to jury trial does not extend
to the determination of damages, even though determining the facts is the jurys primary
function. As established above, Missouri law long has recognized that the jurys role is
precisely to determine both liability and damages and, further, that the article I, section
22(a) right to trial by jury protects the individual right to a jury determination of
damages. Moreover, Tull is irrelevant because it interprets the federal constitution and
deals only with civil penalties, not common law damages. See Sofie, 771 P.2d at 725. In
Tull, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury was not
17violated by a federal statute that permitted the trial judge to set the amount of a civil
penalty. The Supreme Court held that a litigant has the right to have a jury determine
liability, but does not have a constitutional right to a jury determination of a civil penalty.
Id. at 426. The Court reasoned that, with respect to federal constitutional right to a jury
trial, only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of
the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the legislature and that the
assessment of a civil penalty is not one of those most fundamental elements. Id. The
irrelevance of Tull to the jury trial analysis was confirmed in Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., in which the Court stated that:
In Tull ... we were presented with no evidence that juries historically had
determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the Government.
Moreover, the awarding of civil penalties to the Government could be
viewed as analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. Here, of
course, there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical
evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the
amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Tull is thus
inapposite. As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the
actual amount of statutory damages under [the Copyright Act] in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.
523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
Additionally, Adams reaches its conclusion without citation to any applicable
Missouri law. Instead, Adams relies on a Virginia case, Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp.,
376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989), and Tull. In addition to the fact that the interpretation of the
Missouri Constitution should be informed by Missouri law, Adams failed to note that
Etheridge is analytically irrelevant because, unlike Missouris guarantee that the right to
18trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the Virginia Constitution merely states that trial by
jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. Va. Const. art. I, 11. The
Virginia Constitution simply does not provide the same unyielding jury trial right as that
provided by the Missouri Constitution, which demands that the right remain inviolate.
The different language entails a different analysis. See also Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 224
n.8 (noting that Virginia has a less comprehensive constitutional jury trial provision
and, on this basis, finding Etheridge unpersuasive). Adams erred in relying on Etheridge
instead of the plain language of article I, section 22(a) and Missouri common law
precedent.
The preceding analysis shows that the reasoning of Adams and the cases it relied
on are flawed. The only remaining reason to uphold Adams would be stare decisis
considerations. The doctrine of stare decisis promotes security in the law by
encouraging adherence to previously decided cases. Independence-Nat. Educ. Assn v.
Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Mo. banc 2007). But, the adherence to
precedent is not absolute, and the passage of time and the experience of enforcing a
purportedly incorrect precedent may demonstrate a compelling case for changing
course. Med. Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Mo. banc
2005).
Overturning erroneous precedent is particularly important where the precedent
violates a constitutional right because:
If the people are dissatisfied with the construction of a statute, the
frequently recurring sessions of the legislature afford easy opportunity to
repeal, alter, or modify the statute, while the constitution is organic,
19intended to be enduring until changed conditions of society demand more
stringent or less restrictive regulations, and, if a decision construes the
constitution in a manner not acceptable to the people, the opportunity of
changing the organic law is remote. Moreover, no set of judges ought to
have the right to tie the hands of their successors on constitutional
questions, any more than one general assembly should those of its
successors on legislative matters.
Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas Cnty., 47 S.W. 944, 947 (Mo. 1898).
Applying these principles, while this Court always is hesitant to overturn
precedent, it nonetheless has followed its obligation to do so where necessary to protect
the constitutional rights of Missouris citizens. For example, in Independence, the Court
was required to interpret the meaning of article I, section 29 of Missouris constitution,
which commands that employees shall have the right to collectively bargain. Mo.
Const., art. I, 29. This constitutional provision does not limit the right to bargain
collectively only to private sector employees, as City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206
S.W.2d 539 (Mo. banc 1947), had stated. This Court, therefore, overruled Clouse,
stating:
Clouse contradicts the plain meaning of article I, section 29, which states
that employees, without qualification, have the right to collective
bargaining. Deviations from clear constitutional commands although
longstanding do not promote respect for the rule of law. If the people
want to change the language of the constitution, the means are available to
do so. This Court will not change the language the people have adopted.
Clouse is overruled.
223 S.W.3d at 137 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. banc 1975), the Court
addressed the constitutional validity of a statute imposing mandatory consecutive
sentences on defendants who were found guilty of a second offense prior to being
20sentenced for their first offense, a consequence that Missouri statutes did not
impose on those who already had been sentenced on their first offense prior to
being found guilty of their second offense. This Court overruled precedent
upholding the statute because it found this irrational difference in treatment of
comparably situated defendants violated defendants equal protection rights. Id. at
129-31. Likewise, Barker v. St. Louis Cnty., 104 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1937),
reviewed the constitutional validity of a statute that required an owner to seek
compensation within 20 days of a government taking or waive his right to
compensation. Id. at 377. Barker found that the statute violated the plain
language of article II, section 21 of the Constitution of 1875, which stated,
[P]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation. Id. at 377-78. Although Petet v. McClanahan, 249 S.W. 917
(Mo. 1923), had upheld the statute, the Court found that it was impelled to
overrule that case because if there is no doubt that a statute is in conflict with
the Constitution, then it is the duty of any court, whose duty it is to decide, to
declare the conflict and declare the statute void. Barker, 104 S.W.2d at 377.
4


4
Other cases overruling prior case interpretations of a constitutional provision include
Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003)(overturning dozens
of cases that previously had found that, under article V, section 18 of the Missouri
Constitution, courts must view the evidence in administrative decisions in a light most
favorable to the decision); Alumax Foils Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907 (Mo.
banc 1997)(overturning a half century of precedent and finding that municipal ordinances
that raise revenue are not revenue laws of this state under article V, section 3 of the
Missouri Constitution because such ordinances raise[] revenue only within a single
political subdivision for the benefit of that political subdivision.); Mercantile Bank of
Illinois, N.A. v. Sch. Dist. of Osceola, 834 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. banc 1992)(reversing
21Adams erroneous interpretation of article I, section 22(a) of Missouris
constitution negated the guarantee of that section that the right of Missouri citizens to
jury trial as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. It permitted legislative enactments
to infringe on this constitutional guarantee, turning what was a right into a mere privilege.
Adams is overruled to the extent that it holds that the section 538.210 caps on noneconomic damages do not violate the right to trial by jury. Because the trial court
reduced the non-economic damages in reliance on Adams, that aspect of the judgment is
reversed.
IV. Section 538.220
Watts asserts that the periodic payment schedule set out in section 538.220 is
arbitrary and unreasonable in that it prevents a plaintiff from receiving the full amount of
compensation awarded by the jury. This Court has recognized that the general purpose of
chapter 538 is to reduce the cost of medical malpractice and that the specific purpose of
section 538.220 is to spread that cost over time and to guard against squandering the

precedent and finding that the prohibition on subdivisions carrying debt in article VI,
section 26(a) did not preclude subdivisions from entering into contracts that obligated
them to make payments in future years); Barnes Hosp. v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.
1979)(overruling earlier cases that held that if any part of a building was used for profit
none of the building could be excluded from property taxes under the charitable
exception in article X, section 6); State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt, 533 S.W.2d 567 (Mo.
banc 1976)(overturning nearly a century of precedent and holding that imprisonment for
contempt for failure to pay alimony did not violate article I, section 11s prohibition on
imprisoning people for failure to pay debt as long as the person was financially able to
pay); and Hill v. State Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 503 S.W.2d 6, 10-11 (Mo.
banc 1973)(reversing precedent and finding that welfare benefits are in the nature of
property rights and as such are private rights within the meaning of [the
Constitution].).
22judgment while reducing future burdens on government social services. Vincent, 833
S.W.2d at 867. Section 538.220 states in relevant part:
At the request of any party to such action made prior to the entry of
judgment, the court shall include in the judgment a requirement that
future damages be paid in whole or in part in periodic or installment
payments if the total award of damages in the action exceeds one
hundred thousand dollars. Any judgment ordering such periodic or
installment payments shall specify a future medical periodic payment
schedule, which shall include the recipient, the amount of each
payment, the interval between payments, and the number of
payments. The duration of the future medical payment schedule shall
be for a period of time equal to the life expectancy of the person to
whom such services were rendered, as determined by the court, based
solely on the evidence of such life expectancy presented by the
plaintiff at trial. The amount of each of the future medical periodic
payments shall be determined by dividing the total amount of future
medical damages by the number of future medical periodic payments.
The court shall apply interest on such future periodic payments at a
per annum interest rate no greater than the coupon issue yield
equivalent, as determined by the Federal Reserve Board, of the
average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two-week
United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of
the judgment. The judgment shall state the applicable interest rate.
The parties shall be afforded the opportunity to agree on the manner
of payment of future damages, including the rate of interest, if any, to
be applied, subject to court approval. However, in the event the
parties cannot agree, the unresolved issues shall be submitted to the
court for resolution, either with or without a post-trial evidentiary
hearing which may be called at the request of any party or the court.
If a defendant makes the request for payment pursuant to this section,
such request shall be binding only as to such defendant and shall not
apply to or bind any other defendant.
(Emphasis added).
The first two sentences and the second-and-third-to-last sentences, italicized
above, apply to the award of all types of future damages, while the middle sentences, not
italicized above, apply to the special case of periodic future medical payments should
23they be ordered. Looking at the portions of the statute addressing future damages
generally, once the defendant requests a periodic payment schedule for future damages,
then the first sentence of section 538.220.2 plainly requires the trial court to include in
the judgment a requirement that future damages be paid in whole or in part in periodic or
installment payments. Id.; see also Davolt v. Highland, 119 S.W.3d 118, 138 (Mo. App.
2003). The second-and third-to-last sentences of the section make it clear that, in the
final analysis, it was up to the court to determine how large a part of the future damages
would be included in such future periodic payments, for it says that the court must
approve any agreement of the parties as to the manner of payment and interest rate to be
paid and that, if no agreement is reached, then the court shall resolve the manner of future
payments and the interest to be paid. These provisions expressly left the issue of how to
pay future damages and at what interest rate in the hands of the court.
Here, the future damages as to which periodic payment was requested were all
future medical damages. The middle portion of section 538.220.2 is directly specifically
at the manner of paying this type of future damages. It requires that payments be spread
out in equal payments over the recipients life expectancy and determined by reference to
a particular interest-rate benchmark. It takes from the court and the parties the
opportunity to agree upon a different interest rate and payment schedule. But it does not
remove from the court its authority to determine what part of the future medical damages
shall be subject to the payment schedule, for the first sentence of section 538.220.2
24expressly applies to all future damages, and no portion of the statute addressing future
medical damages removes this authority from the trial courts.
5
The statute grants the trial court discretion as to whether to award future medical
damages wholly in periodic payments or in part in a lump sum. Each plaintiffs future
medical costs will be spread out over vastly differing time horizons. Some injured parties
may require surgery or other extensive care in the period immediately following trial,
while others may have only minimal immediate medical needs because their condition is
chronic or the onset of some symptoms will not reach their peak for some years. The
legislature did not intend that the plaintiff who needs an immediate operation or has other
immediate medical or medical-device needs not receive sufficient funds to pay for their
needs until years hence, nor did it intend that a potentially hostile opposing party decide
whether an injured person will receive sufficient funds to pay for medical needs in a
timely manner.
If more than one interpretation of a statute is possible, this Court will interpret a
statute in a manner that renders it constitutional. State ex rel. Praxair, Inc. v. Missouri
Public Serv. Commn, 344 S.W.3d 178, 187 n. 7 (Mo. banc 2011). This Court, therefore,
interprets the statute to permit the trial court to consider the needs of the plaintiff and the
facts of the particular case in deciding what portion of future medical damages will be

5
The dissent would find that the in whole or in part language simply requires the trial
court to comply with the partys request if they ask for a partial lump sum and partial
installment payment plan for future damages owed. Nothing in the statute, however,
invests the parties with the power to determine if all or only part of future damages
should be included in the periodic payment schedule.
25paid in a lump sum and what portion will be paid out over a periodic payment schedule
that accords with the parameters set out in the statute.
Coxs cross-appeal is denied because the statute does not require that all future
medical damages be paid according to a payment schedule.
Watts asserts the section 538.220 periodic payment schedule was arbitrary and
unreasonable in that it does not assure full compensation due to the low interest rate and
50-year payment schedule. The jury, as required by section 538.215, discounted
Naythons future medical damages to present value. The requirement that future medical
damages be discounted to present day value necessarily means that full compensation for
those future damages is, in large part, dependent on the statutory interest rate being the
same as the rate of health care inflation over the course of the payment schedule. Watts
offered expert testimony from two economists who concluded that the 50-year payment
schedule, coupled with a 0.26 percent interest rate, virtually guaranteed that inflation in
health care costs would result in Naython having insufficient funds to pay his future
medical costs. Under these circumstances, the periodic payment schedule affords none of
the financial security intended by the statute. Although section 538.220.2 required the
court to establish some periodic payment schedule, once a present value reduction was
made, use of an inconsistent future damages interest rate guaranteed that the jurys
damages award would not actually cover Naythons future medical damages and,
therefore, would take from him the full value of the jurys award. Consequently, the
judgment is reversed and the case is remanded. On remand, the court shall enter a new
periodic payment schedule that, consistent with the goal of reducing medical malpractice
2627
costs, also ensures that Naython will receive the benefit of the jurys award for future
medical care.
V. Conclusion
The judgment is reversed to the extent it caps non-economic damages pursuant to
section 538.210. Furthermore, the trial court erred by entering a periodic payment
schedule that does not assure full recovery. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed. The case is remanded.
______________________________________
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice
Stith and Draper, JJ., and Midkiff,
Sp.J., concur; Russell, J., concurs in
part and dissents in part in separate
opinion filed; Breckenridge and Price,
JJ., concur in opinion of Russell, J.
Fischer, J., not participating. SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
Deborah Watts as Next Friend for )
Naython Kayne Watts, )
)
Appellant/Cross-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. SC91867
)
Lester E. Cox Medical Centers d/b/a )
Family Medical Care Center, Lester E. )
Cox Medical Centers, )
)
Respondent, )
)
Melissa R. Herrman, M.D., Matthew P. )
Green, D.O., and William S. Kelly, )
M.D., )
)
Respondents/Cross-Appellants. )
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
The facts of this case are tragic. The Watts family has suffered a misfortune that
they will have to live with for many years to come. Despite this unfortunate situation, it
is this Courts duty to analyze the constitutional validity of a statute regardless of how
sympathetic the injury might be. The legislature has passed a limitation on the amount of noneconomic damages an injured person can receive in a tort action. Whether this is
good policy is not a question for this Court. This Courts duty is to determine whether
the provision at issue violates the Missouri Constitution. As Chief Justice Roberts noted
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, courts have the authority to
interpret the law; but [courts] possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make
policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our elected leaders . ___ U.S.
___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). It is not [a courts] job to protect the people from the
consequences of their political choices. Id. This Courts well-established precedent in
Adams by and Through Adams v. Childrens Mercy Hospital, 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo.
banc 1992), has previously determined that section 538.210 does not violate Missouris
constitutional guarantee to a jury trial. Policy judgments must be refrained from, and
instead this Court must determine whether section 538.210 remains constitutional.
Insofar as the majority opinion overrules this Courts well-reasoned, longstanding
precedent in Adams without persuasive justification, I respectfully dissent. However, I
concur in the majority opinions analysis of the interest rate and payment schedule issues.
Adams is controlling in this case
The majority holds that the noneconomic damages cap of section 538.210 violates
the Missouri Constitution, overruling more than 20 years of precedent that authoritatively
decided this issue in Adams. The majority opinion reflects a wholesale departure from
the unequivocal law of this state and leaps into a new era of law. I do not agree with the
2 majority opinions disregard of stare decisis and, more importantly, of settled Missouri
constitutional law.
1
Writing for the majority in Adams, Judge Robertsons holding that section 538.210
does not violate the Missouri Constitutions right to a jury trial is dispositive in this case.
832 S.W.2d at 907. Adams reasoned that the role of the jury is fact-finding. Id. This role
requires the jury to determine liability and measure damages, both economic and
noneconomic, as a result of liability. Id. Once it has completed its fact-finding duty, it
has completed its constitutional task. Id. It is then the courts duty to apply the law. Id.
Section 538.210 establishes the substantive legal limits of a plaintiffs damage
remedy. Id. As such, it is a matter of law, not fact. Id. The court applies the law of
section 538.210 only after the jury has completed its fact-finding duty. Id. Because the
court does not apply the law of section 538.210 until after the jury has performed its
constitutional function, this statute does not violate the constitutional right to a trial by
jury under article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution. Id. Further, this Court
noted in Adams that the legislature is permitted to abrogate a cause of action cognizable
under the common law completely and, therefore, has the power to limit recovery in the
same causes of action. Id.
The majoritys reasons for departing from the holding in Adams are not persuasive
because the issue of whether the legislature may abrogate the right to a trial by jury in a
specific case is not essential to the constitutional validity of section 538.210. The

1
Just this year, this Court upheld section 538.210 with regard to statutorily created causes of
action. Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Mo. banc 2012).
3 majority opinion in this case assumes that the validity of the holding in Adams depends
on the legislatures authority to abrogate common law claims in toto. See also Klotz v. St.
Anthonys Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 773-74 (Mo. banc 2010) (Wolff, J., concurring).
The holding in Adams, however, rested primarily on the fact that section 538.210 honors
the right to a trial by jury. 832 S.W.2d at 907. As long as the jury finds the facts and the
trial court does not interfere with the jurys fact-finding, the jury has served its
constitutional task. Id. The trial courts application of the law to the facts after they have
been found by the jury does not harm to the right to a trial by jury. Id.
The majoritys distinction between the jurys constitutional task and the
individual right to a jury trial is meaningless and a distinction in name only. This
argument confuses the judicial process by which claims are determined with the
substance of the claims themselves. In general, the legislature is free to establish the
substance of a claim, as, for instance, to allow or disallow punitive damages, but the
Constitution guarantees a procedure for adjudicating that substantive claim. Scott v. Blue
Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Mo. banc 2005). The right to jury trial
does not limit the legislature's authority to determine what the elements of damages shall
be.
The jury serves no function other than providing an individual his right to a trial
by jury. As such, the jurys constitutional task is to provide one with his or her
individual right to a trial by jury. Section 538.210 does not prevent the jury from
assessing damages. It is only after the jury assesses damages that the trial court applies
4 section 538.210. When the jury performs its constitutional task, the plaintiff is
afforded his or her individual right to a trial by jury.
Section 538.210 did not violate the Missouri Constitution in Adams in 1992, and it
does not violate the Constitution today. I would uphold section 538.210 consistent with
this Courts 20 years of controlling precedent.
Other states have agreed with this Courts reasoning in Adams
Although the majority opinion cites to other jurisdictions striking statutes limiting
noneconomic damages, many states have held that such limitations do not violate their
states respective right to a jury trial. The majority opinion focuses on the inviolate
language of Missouris Constitution, arguing that this language distinguishes Missouris
right to a jury trial from its sister states jury trial guarantees. While I recognize that
Missouris constitutional language differs from the Seventh Amendment, cases from
jurisdictions with the same inviolate language as the Missouri Constitution have also
found noneconomic damage caps constitutional under the same sound reasoning set forth
in Adams.
The Nebraska Constitution provides that [t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate . NEB. CONST. art. I, sec. 6. The Supreme Court of Nebraska mirrored this
Courts reasoning in Adams in holding that a cap on total damages for medical
malpractice actions did not violate its constitutions right to a jury trial because the trial
court applies the remedys limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its factfinding
function. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43, 75
(Neb. 2003).
5 Likewise, Idahos constitution provides that [t]he right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate . IDAHO CONST. art. I, sec. 7. The Supreme Court of Idaho analyzed
the statutory cap imposed on noneconomic damages in the same way this Court did in
Adams. The Idaho court noted that the right to have a jury assess and award
noneconomic damages existed at the adoption of the Idaho constitution, but that the
statutory cap on noneconomic damages did not violate the right to a jury trial as it existed
at that time. Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1118-20 (Idaho 2000).
Kirkland reasoned: The jury is still allowed to act as the fact finder in personal injury
cases. The statute simply limits the legal consequences of the jurys finding. Id. at 1120.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the legislative cap on noneconomic damages did not
violate its constitution because [t]he legal consequences and effect of a jurys verdict are
a matter for the legislature (by passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the
facts as found by the jury). Id.
In addition, Ohios constitution provides that [t]he right of trial by jury shall be
inviolate . OHIO CONST. art. I, sec. 5. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a statutory
noneconomic damage cap as constitutional in line with other courts addressing damage
caps under same constitutional language. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420,
430-32 (Ohio 2007). Arbino reasoned that the Ohio constitutions guarantee to a jury
trial applied to those causes of action for which the right existed at common law when the
constitution was adopted, and tort actions were such cases. Id. at 430-31. Mirroring the
reasoning in Adams, Gourley, and Kirkland, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the
right to a trial by jury protects a plaintiffs right to have a jury determine all issues of
6 fact in his or her case. Id. at 431. The court continued: So long as the fact-finding
process is not intruded upon and the resulting findings of fact are not ignored or replaced
by another bodys findings, awards may be altered as a matter of law. Id. The statutory
noneconomic damage cap provided that [c]ourts must simply apply the limits as a matter
of law to the facts found by the jury; they do not alter the findings of facts themselves,
thus avoiding constitutional conflicts. Id. at 432.
Further, Marylands constitution provides that the right to a trial by jury shall be
inviolably preserved. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 23. In accord with other
cases involving constitutional guarantees that the right of a jury trial shall remain
inviolate, the Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the statutory cap on noneconomic
damages. Murphy v. Edwards, 601 A.2d 102, 118 (Md. 1992). Marylands constitution
also preserves unimpaired the ultimate historical right [to a jury trial in civil cases] as it
existed at common law. Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Maryland
Supreme Court reasoned, in line with the cases discussed above, that the jury trial right
in civil cases relates to issues of fact in legal actions. It does not extend to issues of law
. Id. In light of that analysis, Murphy held:
[The statutory cap on noneconomic damages] fully preserves the right of
having a jury resolve the factual issues with regard to the amount of
noneconomic damages. Neither the [statutory] limit on recovery nor the
provision that the jury shall not be informed of the limit, interferes with the
jury's proper role and its ability to resolve the factual issues which are
pertinent to the cause of action.
Id. at 117.
7 The majority opinion is also critical of Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d
525 (Va. 1989). The argument is that, because the Virginia constitution contains
different language than the Missouri Constitution in its guarantee of a jury trial, then the
Virginia right to a jury trial is somehow less protective of the right. This is simply
incorrect. Although the majority opinion is correct in noting the different language in the
two constitutions, Virginia has held that its guarantee to a jury trial secures those rights
that existed at common law, as does the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 529; State ex rel.
Diehl v. OMalley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85-89 (Mo. banc 2003) (holding that the right to a jury
trial attaches to actions that existed at common law or actions that are analogous to
actions that existed at common law). In light of the Virginia Supreme Courts
interpretation of its own constitution, there is no ground for this Court to distinguish the
right to a jury trial in Virginia from the right to a jury trial in Missouri with regard to
statutory damage caps. Although the constitutional language contains superficial
differences, the substantive right is essentially the same. This is evident from the
Virginia Supreme Courts analysis in Etheridge. The court reasoned that [w]ithout
question, the jurys fact-finding function extends to the assessment of damages.
Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529. Once the jury has ascertained the facts and assessed the
damages, however, the constitutional mandate is satisfied. Id. Thereafter, it is the duty
of the court to apply the law to the facts. Id. Just as other courts with constitutional
language identical to Missouris jury trial guarantee have held, the Virginia Supreme
Court held:
8 A trial court applies the remedy's limitation only after the jury has fulfilled
its fact-finding function. Thus, [the statutory noneconomic damage cap]
does not infringe upon the right to a jury trial because the section does not
apply until after a jury has completed its assigned function in the judicial
process.
Id. The statutory damage cap was held not to infringe on the plaintiffs right to a trial by
jury. Id.
In addition to the cases that mirror Adams analysis regarding the inviolate right
to a jury trial, there are other jurisdictions in which such caps are upheld under jury trial
guarantees that do not contain inviolate language under the same rationale as Adams.
See Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) ([O]nce the jury has made its
findings of fact with respect to damages, it has fulfilled its constitutional function; it may
not also mandate compensation as a matter of law.); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State 56 P.3d
1046, 1051 (Alaska 2002) (The decision to place a cap on damages awarded is a policy
choice and not a re-examination of the factual question of damages determined by the
jury.); Wright v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 391 S.E.2d 564, 569-70 (S.C. 1990) (A
remedy is a matter of law, not a matter of fact. Although a party has the right to have a
jury assess his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate through an award, the legal
consequences of its assessments.); Judd v. Dregza, 103 P.3d 135, 144 (Utah 2004) (The
damage cap enacted by the legislature represents law, similar to an element of a claim to
which the trial court must comport the jurys factual determinations.).
Further, other states that provide in their constitutions that the right to a jury trial is
inviolate have upheld statutory caps on recoverable damages under different analysis.
See Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc. 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990); Johnson v. St.
9 10

Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) (overruled on other grounds); Fein v.
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
2

Other cases in jurisdictions without inviolate constitutional language have
upheld similar caps under different analysis as well. See Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50 (Me.
1991); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. 414 S.E.2d 877 (W.Va. 1991); Davis
v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1989).
Not only does stare decisis direct that this Court adhere to its previous holding in
Adams, but Adams is also squarely in line with other jurisdictions that have addressed the
constitutional validity of statutory caps on noneconomic damages. I would uphold the
statutory cap on noneconomic damages in section 538.210.

______________________________
Mary R. Russell, Judge
2
Fein did not expressly address Californias right to a jury trial.

7/27/12

Kansas Supreme Court rules that testimony regarding post-driving alcohol consumption (drinking) relevant to drunk driving defense

Kansas Supreme Court strikes a blow for common sense with ruling

Kathryn Swank's driver's license was suspended after a police officer arrested Swank for suspicion of driving under the influence. When the officer found Swank, she had pulled into a driveway and was already out of her car.

Swank admitted she had been drinking, but the officer did not ask Swank if she had consumed any alcohol after she pulled into the driveway. Swank then tested positive to a breath test. Swank filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision.

The district judge ruled in Swank's favor and set the agency order of suspension aside. At issue on appeal was the appropriate role, if any, for evidence and legal argument regarding post-driving alcohol consumption.

The court of appeals reversed, determining that the evidence demonstrated the existence of the officer's reasonable grounds and that Swank's post-driving alcohol consumption could not be considered because it was not among the legal issues enumerated in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(h)(2).

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider Swank's testimony about her post-driving alcohol consumption. The case was reversed and remanded.

7/5/12

Kansas Court of Appeals finds Kansas police officer's detention during traffic stop to be Constitutional violation, grants Motion to Suppress

The Court upheld the trial Court's motion to suppressed based upon a detention designed to allow a drug dog to respond

Last week the Kansas Court of Appeals signaled that the 4th Amendment is still alive in Kansas when they upheld suppression following a traffic stop and subsequent detention. Some highlights are below:

In the early morning hours of November 16, 2010, Officer Bill Powers of the Garden City Police Department observed a vehicle driven by Kala Jones and stopped the vehicle for "driving erratically" or "the actions of driving odd." These actions included the failure to use a turn signal. When the officer approached Jones, he noticed that "she was angry. She was upset that I had stopped her. Her mouth appeared to be dry, to me, like she had cotton mouth. And her words were slurred." He did not smell alcohol or drugs on the driver's person or in the vehicle. The officer's testimony sometimes also mentioned bloodshot eyes, but his testimony was not consistent on this, and his written report failed to mention this observation. The officer also observed the corner of an empty plastic sandwich bag inside the vehicle.

The key point here is that the officer was not investigating the driver for intoxicated driving, although the Court points out that he could have.

When the driver denied the officer permission to search the vehicle, the officer contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Martinez, who arrived at the scene "probably 15 minutes after" the vehicle was stopped. After the officer conferred with his supervisor, they decided to ask all vehicle occupants to exit the car and to call for a K-9 unit. The precise time that elapsed waiting for the K-9 unit is in dispute, but the elapsed time was apparently somewhere between 20 and 40 minutes based upon the competing testimony of the officer and Jones.

Criminal lawyers in Kansas will be sure to keep this case fresh in their memory...

6/28/12

Law professor offers legal analysis of Jay-Z's song "99 problems"

The analysis covers traffic law, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause in traffic stops

An interesting law review article analyzing the Jay-Z sone "99 problems" was done by a law professor at Saint Louis Universtiy recently. It is available here: Analysis of traffic stops in "99 problems"

It is rather interesting to see how the law professor analyzes a gritty rap track in formal legal terms!

6/12/12

Commerce Secretary involved in alleged hit-and-run accident

Man was cited for felony hit-and-run following TWO auto accidents, although it may have been the result of a seizure

Bryson was driving a Lexus shortly after 5 p.m. Saturday when he allegedly rear-ended a Buick as it was waiting for a train to pass, according to the statement.

After briefly stopping to talk to the three men inside the Buick, Bryson left the location in the Lexus and then struck the Buick a second time, authorities said. The men followed Bryson's car and called 911 to ask for police assistance, according to the police statement.

Bryson continued to drive his Lexus into Rosemead, which is patrolled by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, authorities said. There, he allegedly crashed into a second vehicle near the intersection of San Gabriel Boulevard and Hellman Avenue, they said.

Officers found him alone and unconscious behind the wheel of his car, they said.

Bryson was chairman of Edison International, the parent company of Southern California Edison, for 18 years until 2008. He was sworn in by President Obama as the head of the Commerce Department in October.

He reportedly gave the commencement address Thursday at Pasadena Polytechnic School, which several of his daughters attended.

Source - Los Angelas Times

6/7/12

Saudi hit-and-run driver to be beheaded for causing fatal hit-and-run accident

HIt-and-run fatality auto crash the result of "drifting" accident

A Saudi Arabian judge sentenced a middle-aged joy-rider to "death by beheading" after he was found to have accidentally killed two people while performing a car stunt near the capital Riyadh, the Saudi newspaper Al Watanreported on Tuesday.

The negligent driver was "driftin", a pastime in which drivers make their cars spin and skid at high speed. Al Watan reported that the defendant, which it said identified himself as "Mutannish" - "he who ignores" in Arabic, struck and killed two men while performing the thrill-seeking stunt and fled the scene before being arrested.

"The court of Onaiza handed down a sentence to kill the drifter 'mutannish' by beheading as punishment for his heinous deed and to deter others who tamper with the nation's security," the report stated.

Al Watan did not say when the sentence would be carried out. A Justice Ministry spokesman could not be reached for comment.

Saudi authorities have treated deaths resulting from acts of "drifting" as criminally negligent homicides.

5/31/12

Kansas City teenager pleads guilty to 2nd-degree involuntary manslaughter in driving-while-texting accident

Teen driver lost control of vehicle while texting and crashed head on into another vehicle

Rachel N. Gannon, a 16-year-old Northland Kansas City, Missouri girl pled guilty Thursday to involuntary manslaughter due to a driving-while-texting fatality accident in Kansas City. Due to the guilty plea, she must serve 48 hours of shock time in jail before beginning her probation.

The judge suspended Gannons prison sentence and placed her on five years probation.

It was always important for Rachel to accept responsibility for this tragic accident, said Brain Gaddy, her attorney. She apologized to the family in open court.

She has been through a lot of stress but is looking forward to doing what she is required to do by the court and moving on.

Prosecutors said Gannon was sending text messages, looking at her phone and listening to loud music when she lost control of her vehicle in September on a Kansas City, Missouri road. She crashed into a car whch had pulled into a grassy area in an attempt to avoid a head-on collision.

This criminal case resulting from the texting-while-driving accident may have been the first case of its kind in the Kansas City area, and likely in Missouri.

Larimer, who had to be cut from her Nissan Altima, was pronounced dead at a hospital. Her granddaughter suffered a chipped arm bone, hurt neck and numerous bruises.

Gannon admitted to Kansas City police she was looking at her phone when she lost control, authorities said. As she attempted to regain control, the vehicle slid across the roadway and into Larimers car.

5/25/12

Map of Lawrence, KS traffic accidents shows that intersections are the most dangerous areas for car crashes

Johnson County, Kansas, Douglas County & Lawrence personal injury attorneys who represent seriously injured clients in Kansas and MIssouri will tell you that intersection accidents are often the most dangerous types of accidents to be in. This is because these accidents involve "right-angle" collisions which often lead to serious and disabling injuries, including fatalities. The map above supports this belief, the list of accidents below goes into greater detail about the intersections and areas where Lawrence, KS traffic crashes occurred.

A typical intersection accident involves a driver running a red light or turning in front of another vehicle with the right-of-way (failure to yeild). These impacts send the driver and passengers in one vehicle into the side of their car windows or pillars which can lead to serious brain, neck, and spinal injuries. Head and vertebrea injuries often lead to disability or years of pain which can cause thousands of dollars in hospital, physical therapy, and doctor's bills as well as thousands of dollars in lost wages.

Date Case # Location Officer

2012-05-29 02-12-071236 600 BLOCK W 25TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2C2)
2012-05-29 02-12-071235 700 BLOCK MASSACHUSETTS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D3)
2012-05-29 02-12-071234 1400 BLOCK WAKARUSA DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A8)
2012-05-29 02-12-071233 3200 BLOCK W 6TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A9)
2012-05-29 02-12-071232 500 BLOCK LAWRENCE AVE, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A6)
2012-05-29 02-12-071231 1300 BLOCK WAKARUSA DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (532)
2012-05-29 02-12-071230 2600 BLOCK ORCHARD LN, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A3)
2012-05-29 02-12-071229 500 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A4)
2012-05-29 02-12-071228 500 BLOCK VERMONT ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D3)
2012-05-29 02-12-071227 3000 BLOCK W 6TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A3)
2012-05-29 02-12-071226 2400 BLOCK OUSDAHL RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B2)
2012-05-28 02-12-071225 Not Yet Available (2B2)
2012-05-28 02-12-071224 2200 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B5)
2012-05-28 02-12-071223 2200 BLOCK W 31ST ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B4)
2012-05-27 02-12-071222 700 BLOCK VERMONT ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D2)
2012-05-27 02-12-071221 900 BLOCK MASSACHUSETTS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D4)
2012-05-26 02-12-071220 200 SUMMERTREE Heafey, Robert T
2012-05-26 02-12-071219 W 9TH AT VERMONT ST Robinson, Ryan C
2012-05-26 02-12-071218 700 BLOCK VERMONT ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D3)
2012-05-26 02-12-071217 HASKELL AT K010 HWY Garcia, Peter
2012-05-26 02-12-071216 W 14TH AT OHIO ST Lehwald, Steven M
2012-05-25 02-12-071215 3000 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B4)
2012-05-25 02-12-071214 1000 BLOCK MASSACHUSETTS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (280)
2012-05-25 02-12-071213 UNIVERSITY AT OXFORD CIR Hiatt, Samuel
2012-05-25 02-12-071212 4000 BLOCK W 6TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A5)
2012-05-25 02-12-071211 KASOLD AT W 10TH ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-05-25 02-12-071210 U040 AT COMET LN Novotny, Jason
2012-05-25 02-12-071209 E 20TH AT BARKER AVE Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-25 02-12-071208 VERMONT AT W 8TH ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-25 02-12-071207 W 9TH AT OHIO ST Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-25 02-12-071206 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Scheibler, Ty
2012-05-24 02-12-071205 W 24TH AT CROSSGATE DR Krug, Nicholas F
2012-05-24 02-12-071204 2200 BLOCK KASOLD DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B9)
2012-05-24 02-12-071203 U040 AT KASOLD DR Novotny, Jason
2012-05-24 02-12-071202 FLORIDA AT W U040 HWY Polson, Todd D
2012-05-24 02-12-071201 U040 AT VERMONT ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-24 02-12-071200 3000 BLOCK NIEDER RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B2)
2012-05-24 02-12-071199 U040 AT COMET LN Miller, James
2012-05-24 02-12-071198 KENWOOD AT MINNESOTA ST Lindsay, Larry
2012-05-24 02-12-071197 MASSACHUSETTS AT 8TH ST Shanks, Michael
2012-05-23 02-12-071196 U059 AT W 31ST ST Baker, George
2012-05-23 02-12-071195 K010 AT NAISMITH DR Fry, Brad O.
2012-05-23 02-12-071194 1301 23RD Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-23 02-12-071193 1015 23RD Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-23 02-12-071192 100 BLOCK E 11TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (531)
2012-05-23 02-12-071191 KASOLD AT W 8TH ST Miller, James
2012-05-23 02-12-071190 U040 AT MONTEREY WAY Stewart, Charles
2012-05-23 02-12-071189 1800 BLOCK INDIANA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (531)
2012-05-23 02-12-071188 NAISIMTH AT K010 HWY Corder, L
2012-05-23 02-12-071187 3000 BLOCK NIEDER RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (531)
2012-05-23 02-12-071186 ALABAMA AT W 24TH ST Corder, L
2012-05-23 02-12-071185 CLINTON AT LAWRENCE AVE Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-23 02-12-071184 TENNESSEE AT 12TH ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-05-22 02-12-071183 4600 BLOCK TURNBERRY DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A9)
2012-05-22 02-12-071182 MICHIGAN AT PINOAK DR Leitner, Joshua K
2012-05-22 02-12-071181 NAISMITH AT W 21ST ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-05-22 02-12-071180 U040 AT COMET LN Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-22 02-12-071179 U040 AT COMET LN Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-22 02-12-071178 2200 31ST ST Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-22 02-12-071177 U059 AT W 21ST ST Rhoden, Amber
2012-05-22 02-12-071176 1901 LOUISIANA ST Cobb, Michael D
2012-05-22 02-12-071175 U040 AT COMET LN Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-22 02-12-071174 KENTUCKY AT 9TH ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-05-21 02-12-071173 K010 AT N 1500 RD Fry, Brad O.
2012-05-21 02-12-071172 W 9TH AT INDIANA ST Rhoads, Justin
2012-05-21 02-12-071171 800 BLOCK VERMONT ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D9)
2012-05-21 02-12-071170 VALLEY AT UNIVERSITY DR Fry, Brad O.
2012-05-21 02-12-071169 1800 BLOCK BULLENE AVE, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1C4)
2012-05-21 02-12-071168 800 BLOCK MASSACHUSETTS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D3)
2012-05-21 02-12-071167 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT LOUISIANA ST Spurling, Kresten
2012-05-21 02-12-071166 U040 AT MAINE ST Schneider, Brett A
2012-05-20 02-12-071165 2400 25TH ST McClelland, Frank V
2012-05-20 02-12-071164 E 11TH AT HASKELL AVE Lehwald, Steven M
2012-05-20 02-12-071163 711 LOUISIANA ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-20 02-12-071162 K010 AT LOUISIANA ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-20 02-12-071161 W 9TH AT TENNESSEE ST Hogan, Matt
2012-05-20 02-12-071160 U059 AT YALE RD Fry, Brad O.
2012-05-20 02-12-071159 3200 2ND Polson, Todd D
2012-05-20 02-12-071158 1300 BLOCK TENNESSEE ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D4)
2012-05-20 02-12-071157 400 12TH ST McNemee, Matthew
2012-05-20 02-12-071156 1400 TENNESEE Meyer, Timothy A
2012-05-20 02-12-071155 1000 BLOCK MASSACHUSETTS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (3D1)
2012-05-19 02-12-071154 23RD AT LOUISIANA ST Froese, Tim
2012-05-19 02-12-071153 500 ROCKLEDGE DR Novotny, Jason
2012-05-19 02-12-071152 CHARISE AT WHITMORE DR Froese, Tim
2012-05-19 02-12-071151 U059 AT W 9TH ST Hamilton, Larry
2012-05-19 02-12-071150 3500 BLOCK TRAIL RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A9)
2012-05-19 02-12-071149 U040 AT FLORIDA ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-18 02-12-071148 K010 AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Ivener, Ron
2012-05-18 02-12-071147 W 19TH AT LOUISIANA ST Baker, George
2012-05-18 02-12-071146 U059 AT W 19TH ST Novotny, Jason
2012-05-18 02-12-071145 23RD AT LOUISIANA ST Klock, Matthew E
2012-05-18 02-12-071144 2300 BLOCK HARVARD RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2C3)
2012-05-18 02-12-071143 U059 AT K010 HWY Egidy, Robert
2012-05-18 02-12-071142 U040 AT U059 HWY Novotny, Jason
2012-05-18 02-12-071141 MISSISSIPPI AT 5TH ST Polson, Todd D
2012-05-18 02-12-071140 2500 BLOCK CEDARWOOD AVE, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B1)
2012-05-18 02-12-071139 U040 AT KASOLD DR Wech, Chris
2012-05-18 02-12-071138 U040 AT U059 HWY Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-18 02-12-071137 KENTUCKY AT W 16TH ST Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-17 02-12-071136 CLINTON AT LAKE POINTE DR McClelland, Frank V
2012-05-17 02-12-071135 U059 AT UNIVERSITY DR Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-17 02-12-071134 W 25TH AT REDBUD LN Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-17 02-12-071133 1100 BLOCK W 6TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D3)
2012-05-17 02-12-071132 TENNESSEE AT W 19TH ST Brixius, Anthony J
2012-05-17 02-12-071131 JANA AT HARVARD RD Byrn, Michael
2012-05-16 02-12-071130 KENTUCKY AT W 10TH ST Robinson, Ryan C
2012-05-16 02-12-071129 W 20TH AT OUSDAHL RD Baker, George
2012-05-16 02-12-071128 U059 AT 25TH ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-16 02-12-071127 4500 2ND Leitner, Joshua K
2012-05-16 02-12-071126 W 31ST AT OUSDAHL RD Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-16 02-12-071125 10TH AT PENNSYLVANIA ST Ramsey, Michael
2012-05-16 02-12-071124 600 BLOCK WAKARUSA DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A3)
2012-05-16 02-12-071123 U040 AT ILLINOIS ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-16 02-12-071122 NEW JERSEY AT 12TH ST Counley, Alissa K
2012-05-15 02-12-071121 23RD AT ANDERSON RD Froese, Tim
2012-05-15 02-12-071120 U040 AT U059 HWY Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-15 02-12-071119 CLINTON AT KASOLD DR Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-15 02-12-071118 CLINTON AT KASOLD DR Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-15 02-12-071117 W 29TH AT LAWRENCE AVE Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-14 02-12-071116 2828 IOWA Welch, Adam C
2012-05-14 02-12-071115 PENNSYLVANIA AT E 11TH ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-14 02-12-071114 U040 AT TENNESSEE ST Wech, Chris
2012-05-14 02-12-071113 KASOLD AT W 6TH ST Stewart, Charles
2012-05-14 02-12-071112 K010 AT O'CONNELL RD Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-14 02-12-071111 BARKER AT K010 HWY Souders, Leo
2012-05-14 02-12-071110 CROSSGATE AT W 24TH PL Maack, Eric
2012-05-14 02-12-071109 K010 AT HARPER ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-14 02-12-071108 HOME AT E 24TH ST Wold, Jim TC
2012-05-13 02-12-071107 CLINTON AT U059 HWY Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-13 02-12-071106 U059 AT HARVARD RD Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-13 02-12-071105 E 13TH AT OREGON ST Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-13 02-12-071104 NEW HAMPSHIRE AT E 8TH ST Ivener, Ron
2012-05-12 02-12-071103 E 19TH AT HARPER ST Haller Jr, James L
2012-05-12 02-12-071102 1300 MICHIGAN WAY Souders, Leo
2012-05-12 02-12-071101 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT W 24TH ST Spurling, Kresten
2012-05-12 02-12-071100 W 7TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-12 02-12-071099 1100 BLOCK E 23RD ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1C1)
2012-05-11 02-12-071098 520 23RD Baker, George
2012-05-11 02-12-071097 U059 AT HARVARD RD Fry, Brad O.
2012-05-11 02-12-071096 FOLKS AT U040 HWY Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-11 02-12-071095 U040 AT FOLKS RD Welsh, James M
2012-05-11 02-12-071094 1500 9TH ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-05-11 02-12-071093 W 31ST AT LOUISIANA ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-11 02-12-071092 U059 AT W 27TH ST Welsh, James M
2012-05-11 02-12-071091 PARKING LOT AT OVERLAND DR Halsted, Ryan
2012-05-11 02-12-071090 1200 ALLEY Souders, Leo
2012-05-11 02-12-071089 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Scheibler, Ty
2012-05-11 02-12-071088 927 NEW HAMPSHIRE ST Souders, Leo
2012-05-11 02-12-071087 14TH AT KENTUCKY ST RUSSELL, TRACY
2012-05-11 02-12-071086 K010 AT SILICON AVE Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-11 02-12-071085 800 NEW HAMPSHIRE ST Stites, Sheri K
2012-05-11 02-12-071084 KASOLD AT CLINTON PKWY Spurling, Kresten
2012-05-11 02-12-071083 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-11 02-12-071082 1100 ALLEY Stites, Sheri K
2012-05-11 02-12-071081 U040 AT ARKANSAS ST Miller, James
2012-05-10 02-12-071080 W 9TH AT HIGHLAND DR Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-10 02-12-071079 HARPER AT E 21 TER Rhoads, Justin
2012-05-10 02-12-071078 RIVERRIDGE AT N MICHIGAN ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-05-10 02-12-071077 W 9TH AT EMERY RD Heafey, Robert T
2012-05-10 02-12-071076 4700 BLOCK OVERLAND DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (574)
2012-05-10 02-12-071075 INDIANA AT 10TH ST Stites, Sheri K
2012-05-10 02-12-071074 BOB BILLINGS AT U059 HWY Weidl, Matthew R
2012-05-10 02-12-071073 2600 BLOCK W 6TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D4)
2012-05-09 02-12-071072 PACKER AT N IOWA ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-05-09 02-12-071071 W 33RD AT U059 HWY Baker, George
2012-05-09 02-12-071070 U040 AT KENTUCKY ST Schweer, Christopher A
2012-05-09 02-12-071069 W 9TH AT HILLTOP DR Wech, Chris
2012-05-09 02-12-071068 K010 AT OUSDAHL RD Wech, Chris
2012-05-09 02-12-071067 U040 AT ROCKLEDGE RD Stewart, Charles
2012-05-09 02-12-071066 CLINTON AT KASOLD DR Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-05-09 02-12-071065 W 9TH AT MISSISSIPPI ST Caudle, Tyler W
2012-05-08 02-12-071064 W 9TH AT TENNESSEE ST Schweer, Christopher A
2012-05-07 02-12-071063 23RD AT SILICON AVE Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-08 02-12-071062 325 MAINE ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-05-08 02-12-071061 HARVARD AT MULBERRY DR Polson, Todd D
2012-05-08 02-12-071060 ALABAMA AT K010 HWY Maack, Eric
2012-05-07 02-12-071059 BARKER AT K010 HWY Klock, Matthew E
2012-05-07 02-12-071058 E 7TH AT NEW HAMPSHIRE ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-07 02-12-071057 W 19TH AT NAISMITH DR Klock, Matthew E
2012-05-07 02-12-071056 E 19TH AT BARKER AVE Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-07 02-12-071055 3421 6th Stewart, Charles
2012-05-07 02-12-071054 U059 AT W 19TH ST Krug, Nicholas F
2012-05-06 02-12-071053 U059 AT CLINTON PKWY Novotny, Jason
2012-05-06 02-12-071052 MASSACHUSETTS AT W 10TH ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-06 02-12-071051 VERMONT AT W 11TH ST Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-06 02-12-071050 11TH W AT TENNESSEE ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-05-06 02-12-071049 VIA LINDA AT TEMPE ST Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-05-05 02-12-071048 NEW YORK AT E 10TH ST Burke, William J
2012-05-05 02-12-071047 INDIANA AT N U040 HWY Burke, William J
2012-05-05 02-12-071046 1500 BLOCK E 23RD ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2C3)
2012-05-05 02-12-071045 W 9TH AT HIGHLAND DR Horner, Brett C
2012-05-05 02-12-071044 K010 AT BARKER AVE Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-05-05 02-12-071043 U059 AT UNIVERSITY DR Ashley, Daniel A
2012-05-05 02-12-071042 K010 AT ST. JAMES CT Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-05-05 02-12-071041 MASSACHUSETTS AT W 7TH ST Souders, Leo
2012-05-05 02-12-071040 U059 AT W 19TH ST Ramsdell, Stephen
2012-05-04 02-12-071039 CLINTON AT CROSSGATE DR Welch, Adam C
2012-05-04 02-12-071038 U059 AT W 19TH ST Hogan, Matthew S
2012-05-04 02-12-071037 NEW HAMPSHIRE AT E 17TH ST Horner, Brett C
2012-05-04 02-12-071036 KENTUCKY AT W 7TH ST Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-05-04 02-12-071035 MASSACHUSETTS AT E 8TH ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-05-04 02-12-071034 U059 AT W 9TH ST Hiatt, Samuel
2012-05-04 02-12-071033 CLINTON AT LAWRENCE AVE Hogan, Matthew S
2012-05-04 02-12-071032 2300 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B6)
2012-05-04 02-12-071031 MCDONALD AT PRINCETON BLVD Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-04 02-12-071030 LOUISIANA AT SARATOGA PL Souders, Leo
2012-05-04 02-12-071029 W 31ST AT ATCHISON WAY Riggs, Shannon
2012-05-04 02-12-071028 814 IOWA Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-05-04 02-12-071027 1000 BLOCK EMERY RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A4)
2012-05-04 02-12-071026 2200 BLOCK LOUISIANA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1C9)
2012-05-04 02-12-071025 1900 1900 HASKELL AVE Garcia, Peter
2012-05-04 02-12-071024 TENNESSEE AT 14TH ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-05-04 02-12-071023 LOUISIANA AT K010 HWY Garcia, Peter
2012-05-04 02-12-071022 200 U059 Stites, Sheri K
2012-05-04 02-12-071021 U040 AT E 6TH ST Shanks, Michael
2012-05-04 02-12-071020 1433 TENNESSEE ST Chamberlain, Scott
2012-05-03 02-12-071019 AT UNKNOWN ST Egidy, Robert
2012-05-03 02-12-071018 KENTUCKY AT W 10TH ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-05-03 02-12-071017 K010 AT ST JAMES CT Nicholson, Kimberlee A
2012-05-03 02-12-071016 943 23RD Hogan, Matthew S
2012-05-03 02-12-071015 TENNESSEE AT W 10TH ST Rhoads, Justin
2012-05-03 02-12-071014 MASSACHUSETTS AT W 17TH ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-05-03 02-12-071013 300 INDUSTRIAL Souders, Leo
2012-05-03 02-12-071012 23RD AT CRESTLINE DR Stewart, Charles
2012-05-02 02-12-071011 1601 24TH ST McClelland, Frank V
2012-05-02 02-12-071010 TENNESSEE AT W 19TH ST Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-02 02-12-071009 700 BLOCK VERMONT ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D3)
2012-05-02 02-12-071008 MAINE AT W 18TH ST Rhoads, Amy
2012-05-02 02-12-071007 1601 23RD Stewart, Charles
2012-05-01 02-12-071006 VERMONT AT W 21ST ST Fennelly, Andrew
2012-05-01 02-12-071005 LAWRENCE AT 7TH ST Polson, Todd D
2012-05-01 02-12-071004 1600 HARPER ST Horvath, Meagan M
2012-05-01 02-12-071003 4841 WAKARUSA DR Schweer, Christopher A
2012-04-30 02-12-071002 1501 GEORGE WILLIAMS WAY Baker, George
2012-05-01 02-12-071001 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT WEST 9TH ST Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-05-01 02-12-071000 900 U059 HWY Heafey, Robert T
2012-05-01 02-12-070999 RHODE ISLAND AT E 13TH ST Rhoads, Amy
2012-05-01 02-12-070998 RIDGE AT MURPHY DR Spurling, Kresten
2012-05-01 02-12-070997 1626 OUSDAHL RD Maack, Eric
2012-05-01 02-12-070996 19TH AT HARPER ST OSBORNE
2012-05-01 02-12-070995 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Maack, Eric
2012-05-01 02-12-070994 HASKELL W AT K010 AVE OSBORNE
2012-05-01 02-12-070993 1700 BLOCK W 24TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (3B9)
2012-04-30 02-12-070992 E 11TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-30 02-12-070991 K010 AT OUSDAHL RD Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-30 02-12-070990 W 9TH AT KENTUCKY ST Schweer, Christopher A
2012-04-30 02-12-070989 1704 24TH ST Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-30 02-12-070988 23RD AT SILICON AVE Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-30 02-12-070987 K010 AT OHIO ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-30 02-12-070986 U059 AT W 27TH ST Horner, Brett C
2012-04-30 02-12-070985 PARKING LOT AT 550 CONGRESSIONAL DR Miller, James
2012-04-30 02-12-070984 1801 23RD Scheibler, Ty
2012-04-30 02-12-070983 WAKARUSA AT INVERNESS DR Halsted, Ryan
2012-04-30 02-12-070982 900 BLOCK NEW HAMPSHIRE ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D3)
2012-04-30 02-12-070981 200 19TH Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-30 02-12-070980 E 19TH AT LEARNARD AVE Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-30 02-12-070979 E 10TH AT CONNECTICUT ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-30 02-12-070978 2ND AT LYON ST Fennelly, Andrew
2012-04-30 02-12-070977 W 20TH AT OUSDAHL RD Robinson, Ryan C
2012-04-29 02-12-070976 TENNESSEE AT W 12TH ST Fennelly, Andrew
2012-04-29 02-12-070975 U059 AT W 27TH ST R. Egidy L120
2012-04-29 02-12-070974 RHODE ISLAND AT E 11TH ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-04-29 02-12-070973 U040 AT FOLKS RD Maack, Eric
2012-04-29 02-12-070972 TENNESSEE AT W 8TH ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-29 02-12-070971 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Garcia, Peter
2012-04-29 02-12-070970 U059 AT 9TH ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-04-29 02-12-070969 U040 AT LAWRENCE AVE Souders, Leo
2012-04-29 02-12-070968 K010 AT OUSDAHL RD Ramsdell, Stephen
2012-04-29 02-12-070967 U040 AT ROCKLEDGE RD Durazo, Ashley D
2012-04-28 02-12-070966 BOB BILLINGS AT U059 HWY Caudle, Tyler W
2012-04-28 02-12-070965 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT KENTUCKY ST Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-04-28 02-12-070964 LOUISIANA AT W 21ST ST Horner, Brett C
2012-04-28 02-12-070963 PARKER AT EISENHOWER DR Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-28 02-12-070962 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT 11TH ST Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-04-28 02-12-070961 E 19TH AT DELAWARE ST Nicholson, Kimberlee A
2012-04-28 02-12-070960 K010 AT LOUISIANA ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-28 02-12-070959 K010 AT ST JAMES CT Horner, Brett C
2012-04-28 02-12-070958 K010 AT TENNESSEE ST Rhoads, Amy
2012-04-28 02-12-070957 LEGENDS AT LEGENDS DR Rodgers, Kenneth L
2012-04-27 02-12-070956 WINSTON AT CARRINGTON LN Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-27 02-12-070955 K010 AT LEARNARD AVE Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-27 02-12-070954 U040 AT TENNESSEE ST Rhoads, Amy
2012-04-27 02-12-070953 K010 AT NAISMITH DR Horner, Brett C
2012-04-27 02-12-070952 U040 AT LAWRENCE AVE Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-27 02-12-070951 RANKIN AT HARVARD RD Ernst, David
2012-04-27 02-12-070950 U059 AT HARVARD RD Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-27 02-12-070949 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Scheibler, Ty
2012-04-27 02-12-070948 1705 25TH TER Chamberlain, Scott
2012-04-26 02-12-070947 2ND AT MISSISSIPPI ST Polson, Todd D
2012-04-26 02-12-070946 PRIVATE LOT AT W 33RD ST Egidy, Robert
2012-04-26 02-12-070945 MONTEREY AT HARVARD RD Novotny, Jason
2012-04-26 02-12-070944 U040 AT MONTEREY WAY Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-26 02-12-070943 1835 MASSACHUSETTS ST Johnson, Brad
2012-04-26 02-12-070942 LEARNARD AT W 19TH ST Stewart, Charles
2012-04-26 02-12-070941 E 19TH AT BARKER AVE Lehwald, Steven M
2012-04-25 02-12-070940 TENNESSEE AT W 9TH ST McClelland, Frank V
2012-04-25 02-12-070939 U059 AT K010 HWY Baker, George
2012-04-25 02-12-070938 W 24TH AT RIDGE CT Egidy, Robert
2012-04-25 02-12-070937 TENNESSEE AT 19TH ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-25 02-12-070936 100 23RD Baker, George
2012-04-25 02-12-070935 CROSSGATE AT CLINTON PKWY Egidy, Robert
2012-04-25 02-12-070934 MASSACHUSETTS AT 7TH ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-04-25 02-12-070933 2ND AT KTA ENTRANCE RD Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-25 02-12-070932 WAGON WHEEL AT BOB BILLINGS PKWY Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-25 02-12-070931 DUDLEY AT SUNSET DR Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-25 02-12-070930 9TH W AT LOUISIANA ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-04-25 02-12-070929 HARVARD AT WESTDALE RD Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-25 02-12-070928 U040 AT VERMONT ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-04-25 02-12-070927 W 34TH AT U059 HWY Krug, Nicholas F
2012-04-24 02-12-070926 MONTEREY WAY, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A9)
2012-04-24 02-12-070925 1800 ENGLE RD Baker, George
2012-04-24 02-12-070924 1901 LOUISIANA ST Cobb, Michael D
2012-04-24 02-12-070923 W 33RD AT U059 HWY Burke, William J
2012-04-24 02-12-070922 K010 AT ALABAMA ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-24 02-12-070921 K010 AT TENNESSEE ST Scheibler, Ty
2012-04-24 02-12-070920 W 33RD AT NIEDER RD Baker, George
2012-04-24 02-12-070919 U040 AT MICHIGAN ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-24 02-12-070918 U040 AT MICHIGAN ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-24 02-12-070917 U059 AT STRATFORD RD Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-24 02-12-070916 W 31ST AT U059 HWY Maack, Eric
2012-04-23 02-12-070915 INDIANA AT W 12TH ST Schweer, Christopher A
2012-04-23 02-12-070914 KENTUCKY AT W 13TH ST Novotny, Jason
2012-04-23 02-12-070913 MORNING DOVE AT MORNING DOVE CT Fry, Brad O.
2012-04-23 02-12-070912 23RD AT HASKELL AVE Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-23 02-12-070911 W 19TH AT ARKANSAS ST Horvath, Meagan M
2012-04-23 02-12-070910 LOUISIANA AT GREEVER TER Klock, Matthew E
2012-04-23 02-12-070909 3240 IOWA OSBORNE
2012-04-23 02-12-070908 U059 AT W 33RD ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-01 02-12-070907 NEW HAMPSHIRE AT E 8TH ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-23 02-12-070906 K010 AT NEW HAMPSHIRE ST Scheibler, Ty
2012-04-23 02-12-070905 454 IOWA ST Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-22 02-12-070904 2700 BLUSTEM Welch, Adam C
2012-04-22 02-12-070903 U059 AT K010 HWY Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-22 02-12-070902 TENNESSEE AT W 19TH ST Hogan, Matthew S
2012-04-22 02-12-070901 E 25TH AT KENSINGTON RD Nicholson, Kimberlee A
2012-04-22 02-12-070900 U059 AT W 25TH ST Baker, George
2012-04-22 02-12-070899 3600 BLOCK CLINTON PKW, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B1)
2012-04-22 02-12-070898 K010 AT RIDGE CT Maack, Eric
2012-04-22 02-12-070897 U040 AT KASOLD DR Stewart, Charles
2012-04-22 02-12-070896 MAPLE AT N 5TH ST Counley, Alissa K
2012-04-22 02-12-070895 ENGEL AT HILLCREST DR Brown, Willie
2012-04-21 02-12-070894 U059 AT BOB BILLINGS PKWY Wech, Chris
2012-04-21 02-12-070893 WAKARUSA AT INVERNESS DR Novotny, Jason
2012-04-21 02-12-070892 33RD STREET AT NIEDER RD Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-04-21 02-12-070891 LOWELL AT CLINTON PKWY Garcia, David
2012-04-21 02-12-070890 WAKARUSA AT CLINTON PKWY OSBORNE
2012-04-21 02-12-070889 SANDPIPER AT SUNDOWN CT Ivener, Ron
2012-04-20 02-12-070888 BOB BILLINGS AT STONE MEADOWS DR Souders, Leo
2012-04-20 02-12-070887 4821 WAKARUSA DR Souders, Leo
2012-04-20 02-12-070886 K010 AT ALABAMA ST Novotny, Jason
2012-04-20 02-12-070885 U059 AT 24TH ST Emerson, Jamie
2012-04-20 02-12-070884 W 11TH AT MAINE ST Lindsay, Larry
2012-04-20 02-12-070883 U059 AT W 19TH ST Holtzman, Jeffery B.
2012-04-20 02-12-070882 U040 AT MICHIGAN ST Fry, Brad O.
2012-04-20 02-12-070881 TENNESSEE AT W 16TH ST Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-20 02-12-070880 HASKELL AT K010 HWY Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-04-20 02-12-070879 U040 AT U059 HWY Shanks, Michael
2012-04-20 02-12-070878 2301 WAKARUSA DR Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-20 02-12-070877 2330 IOWA OSBORNE
2012-04-20 02-12-070876 23RD AT HASKELL AVE Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-19 02-12-070875 U040 AT LAWRENCE AVE Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-19 02-12-070874 W 12TH AT KENTUCKY ST R. Egidy L120
2012-04-19 02-12-070873 MASSACHUSETTS AT 10TH ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-04-19 02-12-070872 4700 OVERLAND DR Souders, Leo
2012-04-19 02-12-070871 MISSISSIPPI AT W 9TH ST Lindsay, Larry
2012-04-19 02-12-070870 LEARNARD AT 19TH ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-19 02-12-070869 K010 AT LOUISIANA ST Klock, Matthew E
2012-04-19 02-12-070868 2300 RANCH ST Maack, Eric
2012-04-19 02-12-070867 E 11TH AT NEW HAMPSHIRE ST Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-19 02-12-070866 UNIVERSITY AT CRESTLINE DR Brown, Willie
2012-04-19 02-12-070865 155 INDIAN AVE Anglin, Sutagee JC
2012-04-18 02-12-070864 VERMONT AT W 7TH ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-18 02-12-070863 1500 BOB WHITE Horvath, Meagan M
2012-04-18 02-12-070862 2330 YALE RD Rhoads, Justin
2012-04-18 02-12-070861 W 19TH AT MISSISSIPPI ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-04-18 02-12-070860 W 20TH AT TENNESSEE ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-18 02-12-070859 MASSACHUSETTS AT W 14TH ST Stewart, Charles
2012-04-17 02-12-070858 1900 23RD ST Lehwald, Steven M
2012-04-17 02-12-070857 W 5TH AT FLORIDA ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-17 02-12-070856 NEW HAMPSHIRE AT E 6TH ST Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-04-17 02-12-070855 K010 AT HASKELL AVE Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-17 02-12-070854 UNKNOWN AT UNKNOWN RD Rhoads, Amy
2012-04-17 02-12-070853 NORIA AT E 23RD ST McNemee, Matthew
2012-04-17 02-12-070852 U059 AT U024 HWY Miller, James
2012-04-16 02-12-070851 U059 AT BOB BILLINGS PKWY BURKE, W.J.
2012-04-16 02-12-070850 KENTUCKY AT W 15TH ST Welch, Adam C
2012-04-16 02-12-070849 HARPER AT K010 HWY Horvath, Meagan M
2012-04-16 02-12-070848 W 31ST AT NIEDER RD Garcia, David
2012-04-16 02-12-070847 2409 MORNINGSIDE DR Ivener, Ron
2012-04-16 02-12-070846 2409 MORNINGSIDE DR Ivener, Ron
2012-04-16 02-12-070845 BOB BILLINGS AT MONTEREY WAY Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-16 02-12-070844 W 22ND AT NAISMITH DR McNemee, Matthew
2012-04-16 02-12-070843 LEARNARD AT JOHNSON AVE Garcia, Peter
2012-04-16 02-12-070842 MISSOURI AT W 24TH ST Robinson, Ryan C
2012-04-15 02-12-070841 2515 6th Haig, Nathaniel J
2012-04-16 02-12-070840 U040 AT SCHWARZ RD Rhoads, Justin
2012-04-15 02-12-070839 K010 AT LOUISIANA ST Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-04-15 02-12-070838 3140 IOWA Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-15 02-12-070837 HARVARD AT KASOLD DR Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-15 02-12-070836 W 27TH AT ALABAMA ST Garcia, David
2012-04-15 02-12-070835 U040 AT MONTEREY WAY Shanks, Michael
2012-04-15 02-12-070834 1122 ALLEY Fennelly, Andrew
2012-04-14 02-12-070833 W 7TH AT VERMONT ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-04-14 02-12-070832 TENNESSEE AT W 21ST ST Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-14 02-12-070831 MASSACHUSETTS AT E 19TH ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-14 02-12-070830 E 31ST AT HASKELL AVE Walter, Reid Scott
2012-04-14 02-12-070829 K010 AT U059 HWY Welch, Adam C
2012-04-14 02-12-070828 K010 AT ALABAMA ST Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-04-14 02-12-070827 MASSACHUSETTS AT W 19TH ST Machado, Will P
2012-04-14 02-12-070826 U040 AT SIERRA DR Schneider, Brett A
2012-04-14 02-12-070825 2515 W 6TH ST Machado, Will P
2012-04-14 02-12-070824 2511 31ST ST Garcia, David
2012-04-14 02-12-070823 W 9TH AT U059 HWY Burke, William J
2012-04-14 02-12-070822 10TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-13 02-12-070821 APPLE AT W 14TH ST Burke, William J
2012-04-12 02-12-070820 PARKING LOT AT U059 HWY Souders, Leo
2012-04-13 02-12-070819 2ND AT GREYSTONE DR Stites, Sheri K
2012-04-13 02-12-070818 23RD AT HASKELL AVE Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-13 02-12-070817 23RD AT W U059 HWY Spurling, Kresten
2012-04-12 02-12-070816 BARKER AT 21ST ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-12 02-12-070815 CLINTON W AT ATCHISON AVE OSBORNE
2012-04-12 02-12-070814 23RD AT LOUISIANA ST Froese, Timothy
2012-04-12 02-12-070813 CLINTON W AT KASOLD ST OSBORNE
2012-04-12 02-12-070812 U040 AT KENTUCKY ST Egidy, Robert
2012-04-12 02-12-070811 K010 AT ALABAMA ST Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-12 02-12-070810 U040 AT ROCKLEDGE RD Nichols, Richard D
2012-04-12 02-12-070809 W 9TH AT MISSISSIPPI ST Horner, Brett C
2012-04-12 02-12-070808 CLINTON AT LAWRENCE AVE Novotny, Jason
2012-04-02 02-12-070807 HASKELL AT 22ND ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-12 02-12-070806 U040 AT CONGRESSIONAL DR Schneider, Brett A
2012-04-12 02-12-070805 LOUISIANA AT W 20TH ST Garcia, Peter
2012-04-11 02-12-070804 TENNESSEE AT W 17TH ST Garcia, Peter
2012-04-11 02-12-070803 U040 AT FOLKS RD Souders, Leo
2012-04-11 02-12-070802 PRIVATE PROPERTY AT U040 HWY Souders, Leo
2012-04-11 02-12-070801 W 9TH AT AVALON RD Rhoads, Justin
2012-04-11 02-12-070800 PONDEROSA AT E 25TH ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-11 02-12-070799 K010 AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Wech, Chris
2012-04-11 02-12-070798 FLORIDA AT W 5TH ST Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-11 02-12-070797 4525 6TH ST Hogan, Matthew S
2012-04-11 02-12-070796 300 ARKANSAS ST Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-11 02-12-070795 PRINCETON AT ARROWHEAD DR Machado, Will P
2012-04-11 02-12-070794 3100 RANGER Johnson, Brad
2012-04-11 02-12-070793 TILLERMAN AT EAGLE PASS RD Hogan, Matthew S
2012-04-11 02-12-070792 GOWER PL, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (3C1)
2012-04-10 02-12-070791 N IOWA AT PETERSON RD Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-10 02-12-070790 33RD AT FOUR WHEEL DR Welch, Adam C
2012-04-10 02-12-070789 800 K010 E Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-10 02-12-070788 E 6TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Lindsay, Larry
2012-04-10 02-12-070787 U040 AT CRESTLINE DR Nichols, Richard D
2012-04-10 02-12-070786 1000 K010 E Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-10 02-12-070785 U040 AT WISCONSIN ST Rhoads, Justin
2012-04-10 02-12-070784 23RD AT RHODE ISLAND ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-10 02-12-070783 TENNESSEE AT W 7TH ST Lindsay, Larry
2012-04-10 02-12-070782 U059 AT W 25TH ST Robinson, Ryan C
2012-04-10 02-12-070781 K010 AT TENNESSEE ST Scheibler, Ty
2012-04-10 02-12-070780 1400 BLOCK KASOLD DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A5)
2012-04-09 02-12-070779 W 19TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Egidy, Robert
2012-04-09 02-12-070778 OHIO AT W 12TH ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-09 02-12-070777 W 19TH AT ALABAMA ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-09 02-12-070776 1100 ALLEY Souders, Leo
2012-04-09 02-12-070775 U040 AT LOUISIANA ST Wech, Chris
2012-04-09 02-12-070774 OHIO AT W 14TH ST Leitner, Joshua K
2012-04-09 02-12-070773 WESTDALE AT WELLINGTON RD Garcia, David
2012-04-09 02-12-070772 KENTUCKY AT W 9TH ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-09 02-12-070771 W 8TH AT TENNESSEE ST Machado, Will P
2012-04-08 02-12-070770 W 9TH AT TENNESSEE ST Ramsey, Michael
2012-04-08 02-12-070769 U059 AT K010 HWY Novotny, Jason
2012-04-08 02-12-070768 MISSOURI AT W 9TH ST Schweer, Christopher
2012-04-07 02-12-070767 MASSACHUSETTS AT 9TH ST Rhoden, Amber
2012-04-07 02-12-070766 UNKNOWN AT UNKNOWN RD Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-06 02-12-070765 U040 AT LAWRENCE AVE Lindsay, Larry
2012-04-06 02-12-070764 W 31ST AT OUSDAHL RD Egidy, Robert
2012-04-06 02-12-070763 MCDONALD S AT ROCKLEDGE RD Stites, Sheri K
2012-04-06 02-12-070762 NAISMITH S AT W 22ND ST OSBORNE
2012-04-06 02-12-070761 U040 AT ROCKLEDGE RD Nichols, Richard D
2012-04-06 02-12-070760 W 8TH AT MASSACHUSETTS ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-04-06 02-12-070759 U040 AT MAINE ST Hogan, Matthew S
2012-04-05 02-12-070758 W 24TH AT CROSSGATE DR Novotny, Jason
2012-04-05 02-12-070757 2300 LOUISIANA ST Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-05 02-12-070756 U059 AT YALE RD Hogan, Matthew S
2012-04-01 02-12-070755 1233 MASSACHUSETTS ST Orrick, Patrick
2012-04-05 02-12-070754 CLINTON AT LAWRENCE AVE Ashley, Daniel A
2012-04-05 02-12-070753 EMERY AT W 9TH ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-05 02-12-070752 2ND AT VERMONT ST Hamilton, Larry
2012-04-04 02-12-070751 U059 AT K010 HWY Haak, Terry
2012-04-04 02-12-070750 800 BLOCK MISSISSIPPI ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D4)
2012-04-04 02-12-070749 26TH AT RIDGE CT Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-04 02-12-070748 W 33RD AT NIEDER RD Wech, Chris
2012-04-04 02-12-070747 U059 AT W 19TH ST Horner, Brett C
2012-04-04 02-12-070746 W 11TH AT MISSOURI ST Ramsey, Michael
2012-04-04 02-12-070745 W 9TH AT MICHIGAN ST Wech, Chris
2012-04-04 02-12-070744 TENNESSEE AT W 19TH ST Baker, George
2012-04-04 02-12-070743 PARKING LOT AT 3500 W 6TH ST Brett Schneider
2012-04-04 02-12-070742 U059 AT W 25TH ST Rhoads, Amy
2012-04-04 02-12-070741 U059 AT TERRACE RD Brown, Willie
2012-04-03 02-12-070740 1400 K010 E Kemppainen, Dean M
2012-04-03 02-12-070739 E 13TH AT CONNECTICUT ST Welch, Adam C
2012-04-03 02-12-070738 4841 WAKARUSA RD Garcia, David
2012-04-03 02-12-070737 3201 IOWA Robinson, Ryan C
2012-04-03 02-12-070736 W 9TH AT KENTUCKY ST Machado, Will P
2012-04-03 02-12-070735 707.5 VERMONT ST Stites, Sheri K
2012-04-03 02-12-070734 3440 6TH ST Souders, Leo
2012-04-03 02-12-070733 HASKELL AT K010 HWY Froese, Tim
2012-04-03 02-12-070732 23RD AT LOUISIANA ST Welch, Adam C
2012-04-02 02-12-070731 13TH AT PENNSYLVANIA ST Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-02 02-12-070730 CONNECTICUT AT 10TH ST Tubbs
2012-04-02 02-12-070729 KENTUCKY AT W 9TH ST Egidy, Robert
2012-04-02 02-12-070728 K010 AT BARKER AVE Froese, Tim
2012-04-02 02-12-070727 W 14TH AT TENNESSEE ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-02 02-12-070726 K010 AT E HILLS DR Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-02 02-12-070725 K010 AT FRANKLIN RD Froese, Tim
2012-04-02 02-12-070724 K010 AT NAISMITH DR Shambaugh, Tina
2012-04-02 02-12-070723 KENTUCKY AT 13TH ST Tubbs, Charles
2012-04-02 02-12-070722 K010 AT O'CONNELL RD Welch, Adam C
2012-04-02 02-12-070721 W 19TH AT OHIO ST Froese, Tim
2012-04-02 02-12-070720 1100 U059 S OSBORNE
2012-04-02 02-12-070719 K010 AT PONDEROSA DR Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-02 02-12-070718 6 VERMONT ST Polson, Todd D
2012-04-02 02-12-070717 W 19TH AT ELLIS DR Spurling, Kresten
2012-04-02 02-12-070716 W 12TH AT KENTUCKY ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-02 02-12-070715 2ND AT ORCHARD LN Polson, Todd D
2012-04-02 02-12-070714 ALABAMA AT 9TH ST Durazo, Ashley D
2012-04-02 02-12-070713 2ND AT PETERSON RD Polson, Todd D
2012-04-02 02-12-070712 U040 AT KASOLD DR Johnson, Brad
2012-04-01 02-12-070711 E 13TH AT PRAIRIE AVE Froese, Tim
2012-04-01 02-12-070710 2ND AT MICHIGAN ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-01 02-12-070710 U040 AT MICHIGAN ST Barta, Jon D
2012-04-01 02-12-070709 1500 OAKHILL Wold, Jimmy TC
2012-04-01 02-12-070708 927 NEW HAMPSHIRE ST RUSSELL, TRACY
2012-04-01 02-12-070707 W 21ST AT TENNESSEE ST Haller Jr, James L
2012-04-01 02-12-070706 3400 2ND Durazo, Ashley D
2012-04-01 02-12-070705 CRESTLINE AT GRAND CIR Corder, L
2012-04-01 02-12-070704 E 9TH AT CONNECTICUT ST Baker, George
2012-04-01 02-12-070703 W 9TH AT TENNESSEE ST Hachmeister, Aaron
2012-04-01 02-12-070702 POWERS AT HARPER ST Heafey, Robert T
2012-04-01 02-12-070701 500 9TH W Tubbs, Charles
2012-03-31 02-12-070700 500 BLOCK LAWRENCE AVE, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2A2)
2012-03-31 02-12-070699 900 BLOCK W 23RD ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2C3)
2012-03-31 02-12-070698 1000 BLOCK E 23RD ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2C3)
2012-03-31 02-12-070697 800 BLOCK KENTUCKY ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2D5)
2012-03-31 02-12-070696 3300 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (2B5)
2012-03-31 02-12-070695 800 BLOCK IOWA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A9)
2012-03-31 02-12-070694 2300 BLOCK LOUISIANA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B2)
2012-04-01 02-12-070693 K010 AT OUSDAHL RD Fry, Brad O.
2012-03-31 02-12-070692 600 BLOCK MISSOURI ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D5)
2012-03-31 02-12-070691 2200 BLOCK ANDERSON RD, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1C3)
2012-03-31 02-12-070690 500 BLOCK FLORIDA ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A9)
2012-03-31 02-12-070689 500 BLOCK KASOLD DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A1)
2012-03-31 02-12-070688 4300 BLOCK W 24TH PL, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B1)
2012-03-31 02-12-070687 800 BLOCK N FIELD STONE DR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1A9)
2012-03-31 02-12-070686 2700 BLOCK GRAND CIR, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1B3)
2012-03-31 02-12-070685 900 BLOCK ILLINOIS ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (1D5)
2012-03-31 02-12-070684 1000 BLOCK W 24TH ST, LAWRENCE Not Yet Available (3X3)
2012-05-05 02-12-070146 23RD AT HARPER ST Froese, Timothy

5/28/12

Bicycle rider injured after being hit by a car in Kansas City Missouri

The bicyclist is in critical condition after being struck by a car in KC, MO

A Kansas City bicycle rider is in critical condition today with serious head and neck injuries after being struck by a car in Kansas City, Missouri, near 34th and Tracy. Tracy is a 1-way street and police beleive the rider was going the wrong-way when hit by a car in a Buick, early yesterday afternoon. No charges have been filed.

5/14/12

2 killed and 4 K-State students seriously injured in Kansas highway accident near Manhattan, KS

1 vehicle crossed over the center line causing a head-on collision on highway K-18, alcohol is believed to a factor in the crash

The Kansas Highway Patrol is investigating a highway accident/crash on K-18 that killed 2 people and left 4 Kansas State University students seriously and perhaps permanently injured.

The head-on collision happened around 3 AM Monday, May 14 on K-18 in Riley County, 2 miles west of the city limits of Manhattan. The auto accident forced closure of the road in both directions for six-and-a-half hours.

Master Trooper Ben Gardner of the Kansas Highway Patrol said the fatal accident occurred prior to 3 a.m. when a Chevy Silverado 2500 truck crashed into a Buick LaSabre. Of the 6 passengers were in the two vehicles, 2 were life-flighted by helicopter to area hospitals and 2 were ambulanced to local hospitals.

There were additional reports that KHP officials believed alcohol was a factor in the crash, although authorities said the investigation was ongoing.

5/2/12

Missouri high-way head-on car crash kills two

Auto accident involved 3 cars with 1 drifting across the centerline

This is another example of how seat belts save lives...Modern cars are great at protecting drivers and passengers from injuries caused in car crashes, but if you're not wearing a seat belt, your injuries will likely be much more substantial.

Two people were killed on a Missouri highway in a head-on collision involving three cars Friday in Caldwell County, MO. Police believe Mathew Tucker, 21, of Lathrop, Mo., was driving east on Missouri Highway 116, about three miles west of Polo, in a 2009 Ford F-150, shortly before 5 a.m. Tucker crossed the centerline as Rory Hicks, 52, of Cowgill, Mo., traveling west in a 2009 Mercury Marquis, moved to the shoulder of Highway 116 to avoid a collision, said the Missouri State Highway Patrol.

Tuckers truck struck Hicks' car's left front, which caused the latter vehicle to spin and come to rest blocking the westbound lane. Tuckers truck continued east and struck head-on a 1989 Chevrolet driven by Keith Staus, 28, of Polo.

After the second impact, Tucker's vehicle slid, coming to a rest blocking the roadway. Staus' vehicle overturned and caught fire. Tucker and Staus were both pronounced dead at the scene.

Troopers said Tucker was not wearing a seat belt, and it wasnt known if Staus was properly restrained. Hicks, who was wearing his seat belt, was taken to a hospital by private vehicle with minor injuries, the patrol reported.

5/1/12

Kansas city teenager injured in I-70 auto accident in Wyandotte County, KS

Most personal injuries lawyers in the Kansas City area see a lot of highway accidents, such as those on I-70, I35, 435, etc...

An 18-year-old man was injured shortly before noon Sunday in Wyandotte County when the eastbound Buick he was driving slid off Interstate 70 and struck a support beam for an Interstate 435 overpass.

A Kansas Highway Patrol report said the driver, Jacob Hubbert of Kansas City, was taken to the University of Kansas Medical Center after the accident. The extent of his injuries is unknown.

Johnson County DUI lawyers - Get to know the basics:

Johnson County, KS DUI charges have two separate components:

1.  The administrative portion - This is where the State of Kansas is trying to suspend your driver's license for a period of one year, two years, three years, even life!  You only have 14 days from the date of your arrest to request an administrative hearing or your driver's license will automatically be suspended.

2.  The criminal portion - This portion consists of the court hearings where you could be sentenced to jail, court ordered treatment, thousands of dollars in fines and costs, and other perils.

Who we are:

This blog is a product of the staff and attorneys at the Law Office of Scott McFall, LLC.  Our law office focuses on Johnson County driving under the influence (DUI/DWI)  and traffic law.

Please review our blog to learn more about DUI and traffic law in Kansas, and Johnson County in particular:

Feel free to send your comments to: info@johnsoncountykansasduiandtrafficlaw.com